Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Associates, Ltd.

Supreme Court of Louisiana
650 So. 2d 712 (1994)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

While Louisiana's comparative fault law is broad enough to permit a comparison between the fault of an intentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor, a court has the discretion, on a case-by-case basis, to decline to make such a comparison for public policy reasons, particularly when the negligent party had a duty to prevent the exact type of intentional harm that occurred.

Facts:

In June 1988, Christi Veazey leased an apartment at the Elmwood Plantation Apartments complex.
Veazey alleged that management misrepresented security, stating that sheriff's deputies lived on-site and that there had been minimal prior criminal activity.
About two weeks after Veazey moved in, Southmark Management Corporation took over management of the complex.
Veazey alleged that in reality, security was inadequate, management was aware of prior rapes on the premises, and the so-called security officers had no responsibility to protect residents.
Veazey also alleged there were inadequate window locks and poor lighting, and that she had complained to management about the lighting.
On October 3, 1988, at approximately 1:45 a.m., an unknown intruder entered Veazey's second-story apartment through her bedroom window and raped her.
The identity of the rapist remains unknown.

Procedural Posture:

Christi Veazey sued Southmark Management Corporation for negligence in a Louisiana state trial court.
At the close of a four-day jury trial, Southmark requested that the trial court submit a special interrogatory to permit the jury to allocate fault to the non-party rapist.
The trial court denied Southmark's request.
The jury returned an inconsistent verdict, finding Southmark at fault and Veazey free from fault, but then apportioning 60% fault to Southmark and 40% to Veazey.
The trial court granted Veazey's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), reallocated 100% of the fault to Southmark, and entered judgment for the full damage award of $180,000.
Southmark appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's JNOV, finding no reversible error in the refusal to submit the special interrogatory to the jury.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari on Southmark's application to review the Court of Appeal's decision.

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Issue:

Under Louisiana's comparative fault system, should the fault of a negligent apartment complex owner be compared with that of a non-party intentional tortfeasor (a rapist) for the purpose of apportioning damages?

Opinions:

Majority - Kimball, J.

No. In this case, the fault of the negligent apartment owner should not be compared with that of the intentional tortfeasor. Although Louisiana's comparative fault law is broad enough to encompass a comparison of negligent and intentional acts, the determination of whether such a comparison should be made is left to the court's discretion on a case-by-case basis. Here, public policy considerations compel the conclusion that comparison is inappropriate. First, Southmark's duty to provide security to its tenants encompassed the exact risk of criminal attack that occurred; a negligent tortfeasor should not be allowed to reduce its fault by pointing to the intentional act it had a duty to prevent. Second, allowing apportionment would reduce the incentive for landlords to maintain safe premises, as a jury would almost certainly assign the 'lion's share' of fault to the criminal, thereby allowing the negligent party to evade significant responsibility at the innocent plaintiff's expense. Third, intentional wrongdoing differs from negligence not just in degree but 'in kind,' making a true comparison of the two types of fault impossible in many circumstances.

Concurring - Watson, J.

No. The majority is correct that the fault should not be compared, but for a stronger reason: it is logically impossible. An intentional criminal act, such as rape or murder, represents 100% fault on the part of the criminal. This intentional fault cannot be logically compared with the negligence of a party who merely facilitated the crime. The two concepts are entirely different and cannot be placed on the same scale for apportionment.

Dissenting - Hall, J.

Yes. The fault of the negligent and intentional tortfeasors should be compared. The underlying principle of comparative fault is the equitable apportionment of loss among all responsible parties, including non-party 'phantom' tortfeasors. Refusing to compare the fault of the rapist and the landlord creates an anomaly where the negligent party is held 100% liable simply because its co-tortfeasor acted intentionally rather than negligently. The historical rationales for not comparing—such as the harshness of the old contributory negligence bar and the idea that intentional torts are 'different in kind'—are unpersuasive in a modern comparative fault system. Intentional and negligent acts are different in degree, not kind, and a jury is capable of weighing them to achieve a fair apportionment of liability.

Dissenting - Lemmon, J.

Yes. The fault should be compared to maintain the uniform, across-the-board application of Louisiana's comparative fault system. The majority creates an unnecessary exception based on the hollow argument that comparison is too difficult. Negligent acts and intentional acts are simply different degrees on the spectrum of 'fault.' It is conceptually more difficult to compare negligence with strict liability, which courts already do. The court should not create exceptions to the comparative fault doctrine to circumvent the legislature's decision to limit solidary liability, which is the real source of the perceived harshness in this case.

Analysis:

This decision carves out a significant, policy-driven exception to the principle of pure comparative fault in Louisiana. It establishes that trial courts have discretion to refuse to apportion fault between a negligent defendant and an intentional tortfeasor, particularly when the defendant's negligence consists of a failure to protect the plaintiff from that specific type of intentional harm. This holding prioritizes victim compensation and deterrence of negligent conduct over the goal of ensuring that each tortfeasor pays only its proportionate share of the damages. The case-by-case approach creates a degree of uncertainty for future cases, requiring courts to weigh public policy factors rather than applying a strict rule of apportionment.

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