Vasquez v. Hillery
474 U.S. 254 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal conviction must be reversed if the defendant was indicted by a grand jury from which members of the defendant's race were purposefully excluded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Such discrimination is a structural error not subject to harmless-error analysis, regardless of the defendant's guilt or the fairness of the subsequent trial.
Facts:
- In 1962, a grand jury in Kings County, California, indicted Booker T. Hillery, a black man, for murder.
- The grand jury that indicted Hillery was composed exclusively of white members.
- For the seven years prior to the indictment, the sole Superior Court Judge in Kings County had personally selected all grand juries.
- Evidence showed that no black person had ever served on a Kings County grand jury.
- Qualified black citizens were available for grand jury service in Kings County during this period.
- Black citizens had served on petit juries in the county, for which the eligibility requirements were substantially the same as for grand jurors.
Procedural Posture:
- Before his trial in California Superior Court, Booker T. Hillery filed a motion to quash his indictment, arguing that blacks were systematically excluded from the grand jury.
- The Superior Court judge, who was responsible for selecting the grand jury, held a hearing and denied the motion.
- Hillery was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder by a petit jury in the trial court.
- For 16 years, Hillery pursued numerous appeals and petitions for collateral relief in California state courts, all of which were ultimately unsuccessful.
- After exhausting state remedies, Hillery filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, raising the grand jury discrimination claim.
- The District Court found that discrimination had occurred and granted the writ.
- The Warden of San Quentin (the petitioner) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted the Warden's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a criminal conviction that resulted from a fair trial have to be reversed when the defendant was indicted by a grand jury from which members of his own race were systematically and intentionally excluded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
Yes. A conviction must be reversed if the grand jury that indicted the defendant was selected in a racially discriminatory manner. This long-standing rule, dating back to Strauder v. West Virginia (1880), is reaffirmed because intentional racial discrimination in the grand jury selection process undermines the structural integrity of the entire judicial system. This type of constitutional violation is a structural error that is not amenable to harmless-error analysis, as it is impossible to determine what a properly constituted grand jury would have done. The grand jury's broad discretion in charging—including the power to charge a capital offense or no offense at all—means its biased composition infects the entire proceeding from its inception. The Court further noted that automatic reversal is the only effective remedy to deter this grave constitutional trespass, as alternative remedies like criminal prosecutions of officials have proven entirely ineffective.
Dissenting - Justice Powell
No. The error of grand jury discrimination is rendered harmless by a subsequent conviction at a fair trial. The petit jury's guilty verdict, reached beyond a reasonable doubt, confirms that the grand jury's decision to indict was correct, thereby curing any preceding error. The Court's modern harmless-error jurisprudence, applied to many other serious constitutional violations, should govern here. Reversing a 23-year-old conviction imposes an immense and irrational cost on society, as retrial is often impossible due to the passage of time, while the deterrent effect is negligible. The harm from discrimination is to society's confidence in the justice system, not to the fairly convicted defendant, and automatic reversal is an inappropriate and disproportionate remedy.
Concurrence - Justice O'Connor
Yes. The judgment to reverse the conviction is correct in this specific instance. While a petitioner who received a full and fair opportunity to litigate a grand jury discrimination claim in state court should be barred from raising it again on federal habeas corpus, that condition was not met here. The District Court found that Hillery did not receive a full and fair hearing because the same state judge who selected the grand juries also presided over the hearing on Hillery's discrimination motion. Because the claim was therefore properly before the federal court and no compelling case has been made to overturn the established precedent requiring reversal as the remedy, the judgment must be affirmed.
Analysis:
Vasquez v. Hillery powerfully reaffirms that systematic racial discrimination in grand jury selection constitutes a 'structural error,' which requires automatic reversal of a conviction and is not subject to a harmless-error analysis. The decision prioritizes the integrity of the judicial process and the goal of deterring official misconduct over the principles of finality and the societal costs of retrial. This case solidifies the doctrine that certain constitutional errors so fundamentally undermine the framework of a fair trial that the defendant's guilt or innocence is irrelevant to the remedy. It remains a cornerstone precedent for challenging discriminatory practices at the inception of a criminal prosecution.
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