Varner v. Stovall
500 F.3d 491, 2007 WL 2593533, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21715 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
Federal courts will not grant habeas relief unless state court rulings were an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Neither Michigan's clergy-penitent privilege, which does not extend to private writings, nor its limitations on self-defense and provocation theories in premeditated murder-for-hire cases, violate the First, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments.
Facts:
- On November 27, 1995, Janniss Varner attempted to murder her abusive boyfriend, Alvin Knight, by hiring a third party to shoot him.
- Knight arrived at Varner’s mother’s home to pick up his son, and Varner’s mother directed him to the garage, where a man shot at him.
- Knight wrestled the gun away from the shooter and turned it over to the police, but he could not identify the assailant.
- Two-and-a-half years later, Knight was killed outside his apartment complex (unrelated to the 1995 assault but led to discovery of evidence).
- Police searched Knight’s apartment and found Varner’s journals, which identified the 1995 gunman and disclosed Varner’s responsibility for arranging the attempted murder.
- The journals also detailed Knight’s past abuse of Varner, including rape and choking, and noted a specific incident two days prior to the shooting where he raped and tied her up for three hours.
- Varner’s journal entries expressed her wish that Knight had died, her lack of remorse, and her determination to kill him in the future.
- Many entries were addressed “Dear God,” sometimes contained prayers, and at other times expressed disillusionment with organized religion.
- Michigan law provides a clergy-penitent privilege for communications with clergy members, but does not explicitly extend it to private writings.
Procedural Posture:
- Janniss Varner was charged with assault with intent to commit murder for her involvement in a 1995 shooting.
- At trial, the state court admitted excerpts from her journals into evidence.
- The state court denied Varner's request to introduce expert testimony on Battered Women’s Syndrome to support theories of self-defense and provocation.
- The state court also denied a mitigation instruction on provocation, reasoning these defenses were not available in cases involving 'hired' third-party shootings.
- A jury convicted Varner of assault with intent to commit murder.
- Varner received a sentence of 13 to 20 years’ imprisonment.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction.
- The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
- Varner filed a federal habeas petition in the U.S. District Court.
- The U.S. District Court denied her federal habeas petition.
- The U.S. District Court granted Varner a certificate of appealability on two issues: the Religion Clauses violation regarding journal entries, and the due-process right to present a defense based on provocation and self-defense.
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Issue:
1. Does a state court's refusal to apply the clergy-penitent privilege to private journal entries containing prayers, thereby allowing their admission as evidence, violate a defendant's rights under the Religion Clauses of the First and Fourteenth Amendments? 2. Do a state court's restrictions on presenting evidence of Battered Women's Syndrome in support of self-defense and provocation theories in a murder-for-hire case violate a defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present a defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Sutton, Circuit Judge
No, a state court's refusal to apply the clergy-penitent privilege to private journal entries, even those containing prayers, does not violate a defendant's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, nor do restrictions on self-defense and provocation in a murder-for-hire scheme violate a defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Regarding the Religion Clauses, the Michigan state courts reasonably applied federal law because the clergy-penitent privilege, like attorney-client and physician-patient privileges, is rooted in the need for confidential communication with a professional counselor. This privilege historically requires a communication directed to a member of the clergy in their professional capacity, not private writings to God. The court noted that extending the privilege to private journal entries would depart from its traditional purpose of protecting individuals from having their counselors subpoenaed to testify against them. This limitation does not discriminate between religions, as it applies uniformly to all faiths (or no faith) and their private writings, not just those using intermediaries. The court referenced Gillette v. United States (1971), which upheld a law distinguishing based on individual belief rather than sectarian affiliation, as analogous. Regarding the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present a defense, the state courts reasonably concluded that theories of self-defense and provocation were not applicable in Varner's case. Self-defense under Michigan law requires an honest and reasonable belief of imminent danger or serious bodily harm, which is absent in a premeditated murder-for-hire scheme. Provocation requires acting out of passion based on an adequate event causing a reasonable person to lose control. The court found that hiring a contract killer, by its nature, demonstrates a lack of immediacy and passion that precludes these defenses. The court emphasized the broad latitude states have in establishing evidentiary rules, which federal courts will only override if they offend a fundamental principle of justice, which was not the case here.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high bar for federal habeas relief under AEDPA, requiring state court decisions to be an 'unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.' It clarifies the limited scope of the clergy-penitent privilege, underscoring its historical purpose as protecting confidential communications made to a religious professional, not private expressions of faith. Furthermore, the decision affirms states' discretion in defining the elements of self-defense and provocation, particularly in cases involving premeditation, illustrating that the right to present a defense is subject to reasonable restrictions and evidentiary rules.
