Vanderhoek v. Willy
2000 Ind. App. LEXIS 710, 728 N.E.2d 213, 2000 WL 576488 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
Under Indiana's Dram Shop Act, a defendant's actual knowledge of a person's visible intoxication may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the person's high blood alcohol concentration and obvious impairment shortly after being furnished alcohol. This standard applies equally to commercial vendors and to social hosts who possess or control the alcohol they provide.
Facts:
- On December 24, 1992, Terry L. Neil arrived at the Fraternal Order of Eagles (FOE) bar between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m., having consumed no alcohol prior to his arrival.
- While at the FOE for approximately one hour, Neil sat at the bar with his mother, Gertrude Willy.
- Neil ordered one beer himself, Willy ordered an unspecified number of beers for both of them, and Neil won two additional drinks while playing pool.
- At approximately 9:00 p.m., shortly after leaving the FOE, Neil drove his car and caused an accident that injured Michelle Vanderhoek.
- At 9:19 p.m., a police officer at the accident scene observed that Neil had a strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, slurred and confused speech, and an angry demeanor.
- Neil failed multiple field sobriety tests, including a walk-and-turn and a one-leg-stand test.
- A breath test administered at the police station revealed Neil had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .15%.
Procedural Posture:
- Michelle Vanderhoek sued Terry L. Neil, Gertrude Willy, and the Fraternal Order of Eagles (FOE) in an Indiana trial court.
- Defendant FOE filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the trial court denied.
- Defendant Willy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the trial court granted.
- Plaintiff Vanderhoek filed a Motion to Correct Errors regarding the summary judgment for Willy, which the trial court overruled.
- The trial court certified its orders on both summary judgment motions as appropriate for interlocutory appeal.
- Vanderhoek (as appellant) and the FOE (as appellant) both petitioned the Indiana Court of Appeals to accept the appeal.
- The Court of Appeals accepted and consolidated the interlocutory appeals of Vanderhoek and the FOE.
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Issue:
Does circumstantial evidence of a driver's significant intoxication shortly after leaving a premises create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the providers of alcohol had actual knowledge of the driver's visible intoxication, for purposes of liability under Indiana's Dram Shop Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Bailey, J.
Yes. A genuine issue of material fact regarding a furnisher's actual knowledge of visible intoxication can be established through circumstantial evidence. For the FOE, Neil's high BAC and obvious state of intoxication shortly after leaving the premises allows for a reasonable inference that FOE personnel had actual knowledge of his intoxication when they served him. For Willy, by ordering beers for Neil, she possessed or controlled them, thus 'furnishing' them under the Act. Since she was sitting with Neil, it is reasonable to infer that she too had actual knowledge of his intoxication. The Dram Shop Act does not distinguish between commercial vendors and gratuitous servers (social hosts); both are subject to liability for furnishing alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person.
Analysis:
This decision significantly impacts Dram Shop litigation by confirming that direct evidence of a person's visible intoxication at the time of service is not required for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment. It establishes that strong circumstantial evidence, particularly a high BAC and signs of impairment shortly after consumption, can create a triable issue of fact regarding the server's 'actual knowledge.' Furthermore, the court explicitly places social hosts on the same legal footing as commercial vendors, broadening the scope of liability for individuals who provide alcohol in social settings. This precedent makes it more difficult for both commercial and social furnishers of alcohol to have such cases dismissed before trial.
