Vance v. Ball State Univ.
2013 U.S. LEXIS 4703, 186 L. Ed. 2d 565, 570 U.S. 421 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
For the purposes of an employer's vicarious liability for workplace harassment under Title VII, an employee is a 'supervisor' only if they are empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim.
Facts:
- Maetta Vance, an African-American woman, began working for Ball State University (BSU) in 1989 as a catering assistant.
- Vance alleged that over several years, a white co-worker, Saundra Davis, subjected her to a racially hostile work environment.
- The alleged harassment included Davis glaring at Vance, slamming pots and pans around her, and intimidating her.
- It was undisputed by both parties that Davis did not have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance.
- Davis's job description stated she was to 'lead and direct' other employees, but Vance's daily tasks were assigned by a general manager and a chef through 'prep lists'.
- In late 2005 and early 2006, Vance filed internal complaints with BSU and charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) concerning Davis's conduct.
- BSU made attempts to address the conflict between Vance and Davis, but the workplace strife persisted.
Procedural Posture:
- Maetta Vance sued Ball State University (BSU) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana for creating a racially hostile work environment under Title VII.
- Vance argued that because her harasser, Saundra Davis, was her supervisor, BSU was vicariously liable.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for BSU, ruling Davis was not a supervisor because she could not 'hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline' Vance.
- Vance, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which heard the case against appellee BSU.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that its precedent required a supervisor to have the power to take tangible employment actions.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the definition of a 'supervisor' under Title VII.
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Issue:
Under Title VII, is an employee a 'supervisor' for purposes of imposing vicarious liability on an employer for workplace harassment only if that employee is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
Yes. An employee is a 'supervisor' for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII only if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim. The framework established in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. Boca Raton presupposes a clear distinction between supervisors and co-workers, which is essential for the workable administration of Title VII claims. Defining a supervisor based on the authority to effect a 'significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,' provides a clear, readily applicable standard. The alternative, broader definition advocated by the EEOC, which includes employees who direct a victim's daily work, is 'a study in ambiguity' and would create confusion for judges and juries. Harassment by employees who do not meet this standard should be analyzed under the negligence standard for co-worker harassment, where the victim must show the employer knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take remedial action.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. While maintaining his belief that the foundational cases of Ellerth and Faragher were wrongly decided, he joined the majority's opinion because its definition of 'supervisor' provides the narrowest and most workable rule for determining when an employer may be held vicariously liable for an employee's harassment.
Dissenting - Justice Ginsburg
No. Supervisor status should extend to any employee who has the authority to direct another's daily work activities, not just those with the power to take tangible employment actions. The majority’s narrow definition ignores the realities of the workplace, where employees who control daily assignments wield significant power that can facilitate harassment. This decision contravenes the agency law principles of Faragher and Ellerth, which recognized that liability stems from the authority the employer delegates to an employee. By severely limiting the definition of a supervisor, the Court undermines Title VII's protective purpose, shifts the burden of proof to the victim to prove employer negligence, and will leave many employees without a remedy for severe harassment perpetrated by those who control their work lives.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the path to employer vicarious liability under Title VII by adopting a bright-line, status-based definition of 'supervisor' over a more functional, fact-intensive inquiry. It prioritizes judicial administrability and predictability over a broader interpretation of workplace power dynamics. As a result, it is now more difficult for plaintiffs to hold employers automatically liable for harassment by team leads or lower-level managers who lack the authority to hire or fire. This places a greater burden on plaintiffs in such cases to prove that the employer was negligent, which requires showing the employer knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to act.
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