Van Dusen v. Stotts
1999 Ind. LEXIS 417, 1999 WL 463489, 712 N.E.2d 491 (1999)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Indiana's two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations is unconstitutional as applied if it bars a claim before a plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the malpractice and resulting injury; the statute is construed to incorporate a discovery rule for such claims.
Facts:
- In June 1992, William H. Stotts visited his family doctor, who performed a routine prostate examination, found an abnormality, and ordered an elevated PSA blood test.
- In July 1992, Stotts was referred to Dr. Robert Allen, a urologist, who found a small tumor, performed a needle biopsy, and sent the sample to Columbus Regional Hospital Pathology Department.
- On July 24 and July 27, 1992, Dr. Delbert Van Dusen and Dr. David O’Brien, respectively, read the biopsy slides and reported the tissue as benign; Dr. Allen then informed Stotts that the biopsy results showed no cancer.
- Around Thanksgiving 1994, Stotts experienced pain and swelling in his groin and lower back, leading to further tests which showed abnormalities and suggested possible cancer metastasis.
- In January 1995, Dr. Allen diagnosed Stotts with incurable prostate cancer that had spread to his lymph nodes and bones, and in response to Stotts's inquiry, stated that the original 1992 biopsy might have been misread.
- In January 1996, Stotts's urologist arranged for the 1992 biopsy slides to be reread by a different pathologist, who determined the tissue to be malignant.
- In February 1996, Dr. Allen informed Stotts that the 1992 biopsy slides had been 'badly misread' and that Stotts likely had only three to six months to live.
Procedural Posture:
- On April 3, 1996, William H. Stotts and his wife filed a complaint alleging negligence with the Indiana Department of Insurance, naming Columbus Regional Hospital and 'Dr. X' as defendants.
- On April 10, 1996, they filed a second amended complaint, which first named Dr. Delbert Van Dusen as a defendant.
- On July 30, 1996, they filed a fourth amended complaint, which added Dr. David O’Brien as a defendant.
- On September 19, 1996, the Stottses filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the trial court (a court of first instance), requesting a declaration that Indiana Code section 34-18-7-l(b) was unconstitutional as applied to their case.
- Defendants (Columbus Regional Hospital, Dr. Van Dusen, and Dr. O’Brien) moved for a preliminary determination of law and for summary judgment on the statute of limitations question.
- Plaintiffs opposed the defendants’ motion and also filed their own motion for summary judgment.
- After a hearing, the trial court granted the Stottses’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that the two-year occurrence-based statute of limitations was unconstitutional as applied because the plaintiffs could not have discovered the alleged misdiagnosis within the statutory period.
- Defendants challenged the trial court’s decision by appealing to the Indiana Supreme Court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Indiana's two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations, which typically runs from the date of occurrence, violate Article I, Section 12 (Open Courts Clause) and Article I, Section 23 (Privileges and Immunities Clause) of the Indiana Constitution when applied to preclude a claim before a plaintiff knows of the malpractice and resulting injury, or discovers facts which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to such discovery?
Opinions:
Majority - Selby, J.
Yes, Indiana's two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations violates the Indiana Constitution's Open Courts and Privileges and Immunities Clauses when applied to preclude a claim before a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the malpractice and resulting injury. Consistent with the holding in Martin v. Richey, the Court reiterates that the occurrence-based statute cannot constitutionally bar a claim before a plaintiff knows of the malpractice and resulting injury, or discovers facts that, with reasonable diligence, should lead to that discovery. To do otherwise would impose an impossible condition on access to courts (Article I, Section 12) and fail to apply uniformly to all medical malpractice victims as required by Article I, Section 23. The Court construes Indiana Code § 34-18-7-1(b) to permit claims within two years of such discovery, aiming to further the legislature's intent to encourage prompt claims and control insurance costs without violating constitutional constraints. Applying this construction, the Court concluded that Stotts discovered sufficient facts to trigger the two-year period in January 1995, when Dr. Allen informed him of his incurable cancer and the possibility of a misread 1992 biopsy. Since Stotts filed his claim in April 1996, it was timely. The trial court's decision granting summary judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Concurring - Sullivan, J.
Justice Sullivan concurs with the result of the majority opinion. While he did not join the decision in Martin v. Richey, he accepts its interpretation of Article I, Section 12 and Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution as stare decisis (established precedent) for the purposes of this case.
Analysis:
This case, alongside Martin v. Richey, significantly shapes Indiana's medical malpractice jurisprudence by establishing a discovery rule for the statute of limitations, especially for latent injuries. The decision ensures that patients suffering from conditions with long latency periods, like cancer, are not unfairly barred from pursuing claims before they could reasonably know of their injury or its cause, thus upholding constitutional guarantees of access to courts. By construing, rather than striking down, the statute, the Court maintains legislative intent to encourage timely claims while protecting fundamental rights. This ruling serves as a vital precedent for future cases involving delayed diagnosis or other forms of medical malpractice where the injury's discovery is not immediate.
