Van Buskirk v. State
1980 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 150, 1980 OK CR 38, 611 P.2d. 271 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
A person who places another in a position of peril has a legal duty to render aid, and the failure to do so can constitute culpable negligence sufficient for a second-degree manslaughter conviction if the victim's subsequent death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that failure.
Facts:
- During an argument while driving, the appellant and her boyfriend, Robert Rose, stopped their car in a low place between two hills.
- The appellant ordered Rose to get out of the car.
- The appellant's vehicle then lurched forward, striking Rose and throwing him onto the hood.
- The appellant braked, which threw Rose from the hood onto the ground in the roadway.
- According to the appellant's testimony, Rose was starting to get up as she drove away.
- A passing motorist saw Rose lying in the roadway 'sort of moaning'.
- The appellant abandoned Rose, who was helpless in a lane of traffic.
- Subsequently, a second, rapidly approaching car struck and killed Rose.
Procedural Posture:
- The appellant was charged with Murder in the Second Degree in the Pontotoc County District Court.
- Following a jury trial, she was convicted of the lesser-included offense of Manslaughter in the Second Degree.
- The trial court sentenced the appellant to two years' imprisonment.
- The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a driver's act of abandoning an injured person in the middle of a roadway, after having struck them with their vehicle, constitute culpable negligence sufficient for a conviction of second-degree manslaughter when the person is subsequently killed by another vehicle?
Opinions:
Majority - Cornish, Presiding Judge
Yes. A driver's act of abandoning an injured person in a position of peril constitutes culpable negligence sufficient for a manslaughter conviction where it is reasonably foreseeable that further harm could result in death. The court reasoned that the relevant criminal act was not the initial striking of the victim with the vehicle, which might fall under the negligent homicide statute, but the subsequent abandonment of the victim in a dangerous position. The court found it was reasonably foreseeable that another car might strike the victim, who was left helpless in a lane of traffic in a low spot between two hills. This failure to act, or omission, after creating the peril, falls squarely within the 'culpable negligence' provision of the second-degree manslaughter statute.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the legal concept of 'culpable negligence' in the context of criminal omissions. It establishes that a duty to act, the breach of which can lead to a manslaughter conviction, arises when a person's own actions create a dangerous situation for another. The case is significant for its application of foreseeability to the chain of causation, holding that a defendant can be liable for a death caused by an intervening actor (the second driver) if that intervention was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent failure to render aid.
