Valley View Industrial Park v. City of Redmond
107 Wash. 2d 621, 733 P.2d 182 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A property owner acquires vested rights to develop property under the zoning ordinances in effect at the time a sufficiently complete building permit application is filed, particularly when local government actions frustrate diligent, good faith efforts to complete the permit process, potentially extending to the entire project where the planned development makes an alternative use infeasible.
Facts:
- Valley View Industrial Park, a partnership formed in 1978, intended to develop a 26.71-acre parcel of land in the Sammamish River Valley with an industrial park consisting of 12 buildings in phases.
- The City of Redmond annexed the property in 1964 and changed its zoning from agricultural to 'light industrial'.
- On September 3, 1978, Valley View submitted a preliminary site plan to the City of Redmond and was incorrectly informed by a city planner that a shoreline substantial development permit would be required due to the property's proximity to the Sammamish River.
- On September 7, 1978, following the city's advice, Valley View filed a more detailed site plan, a SEPA environmental checklist, a shoreline substantial development permit application (for a building within 200 feet of the river), and plans for the first of 12 buildings (Building A-1).
- The City's building department head refused to process the single building permit application until site plan review had been completed on the project.
- In early 1979, Redmond officials informed Valley View that to vest its rights to construct the entire project if the City downzoned the property, it would have to file additional building permit applications, even though site plan review was incomplete.
- Valley View then filed four additional building permit applications (for buildings L-1, C-1, D-1, and F) in April and May 1979, bringing the total to five.
- On June 5, 1979, the Redmond City Council enacted a revised zoning code that downzoned the Valley View property from light industrial to agricultural use.
- Despite sending a letter in May 1980 stating the building permit applications were deemed abandoned, City officials later assured Valley View that it could still proceed under the permits.
- Valley View filed an application to change the city land use plan and zoning for the property from agricultural back to light industrial, which the city council denied on April 7, 1981.
Procedural Posture:
- Valley View Industrial Park initiated an action in state trial court against the City of Redmond, seeking a writ of mandamus, a declaration that the zoning change was an uncompensated taking, and damages and attorney's fees.
- The trial court dismissed Valley View's claim for interim damages but conducted a trial on the remaining issues.
- The trial court found in favor of Valley View, holding the zoning change unconstitutional and ordering the City to proceed with site plan review.
- The City of Redmond appealed the trial court's decision to the Washington Court of Appeals.
- On Valley View's motion, the case was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Washington Supreme Court pursuant to RAP 4.3.
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Issue:
Does a property owner acquire vested rights to develop an entire industrial park under the original light industrial zoning, even for buildings without filed permit applications, when a city's actions frustrate the permit application process and subsequently downzones the property to agricultural use?
Opinions:
Majority - Callow, J.
Yes, Valley View acquired vested rights to have its five building permit applications processed under the light industrial zoning classification in effect at the time of filing, and the entire property must remain zoned as light industrial with the possibility of additional light industrial buildings being constructed. The court affirmed Washington's 'date certain vesting rights doctrine,' which dictates that a property owner's right to use their property vests under the zoning ordinance applicable at the time a building permit application is made (State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue). This doctrine protects developers from unpredictable legislative policy changes and ensures due process (West Main Assocs. v. Bellevue). The court found that despite the incompleteness of Valley View's applications, a limited exception applied, as established in Parkridge v. Seattle and Mercer Enters. v. Bremerton. This exception allows a right to vest when a developer's diligent, good faith efforts to complete an application are explicitly frustrated by local government officials. The trial court's findings clearly demonstrated that Valley View diligently attempted to obtain permits, and Redmond officials obstructed these attempts. The court extended these vested rights beyond the five filed permit applications to the entire 26.71-acre industrial park, reasoning that if the five buildings were constructed, the property would be unsuitable for agricultural use. Therefore, the City's rezoning decision to agricultural use, impacting only Valley View's tract, bore no substantial relationship to the public welfare (Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Comm'ty Coun. v. Snohomish Cy.) and could not stand against the vested right. Regarding the unconstitutional taking claim, the court concluded that no taking occurred because the property remained zoned light industrial due to the vested rights. The delays in processing the permits, although caused by City frustration, did not extend beyond a reasonable period for permit issuance and thus did not constitute an interim taking warranting damages or attorney fees.
Dissenting - Dore, J.
No, Valley View should only have vested rights in the five buildings for which it filed building permits, and the majority's decision to rezone the entire parcel to light industrial use improperly usurps the legislative power of the City of Redmond. Justice Dore concurred that Valley View had vested rights for the five filed building permits due to the City's unwarranted interference, in line with Parkridge v. Seattle. However, he argued that the 'date certain vesting rights doctrine' applies only to actual, sufficiently complete building permit applications that are filed. He contended that the majority's decision to extend vested rights to the seven additional buildings, for which no permits were filed, creates new law without authority and overrules established precedent (State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, Hull v. Hunt, Parkridge v. Seattle, Mercer Enters. v. Bremerton, Norco Constr., Inc. v. King Cy.). Justice Dore emphasized that rezoning is a legislative function and that the judiciary's overturning of the city council's rezone boundary decision violated the separation of powers doctrine. He argued that securing vested rights for a portion of a property merely grants a nonconforming use for that specific portion and does not invalidate the entire subsequent zoning ordinance for the broader parcel. He also highlighted the speculative nature of development for buildings without filed permits or identified tenants, criticizing the majority for granting development rights without the standard time restrictions associated with building permits.
Analysis:
This case significantly strengthens Washington's developer-friendly 'date certain vesting rights doctrine' by demonstrating that even an incomplete permit application can secure vested rights if the local government obstructs the good-faith efforts to complete it. The court's willingness to extend these vested rights to an entire development project, beyond only the permits filed, effectively freezes the zoning for the entire parcel, significantly limiting a municipality's ability to subsequently rezone. This ruling serves as a strong protection for developers against arbitrary or uncooperative government action in land use planning, while also clarifying that administrative delays, even if frustrating, do not automatically constitute a compensable regulatory taking absent an actual deprivation of viable economic use or a direct unconstitutional action.
