v. Cooke
2021 CO 17 (2021)
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Rule of Law:
A legislative body's use of multiple computers to simultaneously and unintelligibly recite different portions of a bill at high speed does not satisfy the constitutional requirement that a bill be 'read at length.' While the judiciary has the authority to declare such a method unconstitutional, it may not, under the doctrine of separation of powers, prescribe the specific manner in which the legislature must comply with the requirement.
Facts:
- In early 2019, House Bill 19-1172, a 2,023-page bill recodifying statutes on professions and occupations, passed the Colorado House of Representatives and was introduced in the Senate.
- On March 11, 2019, during the bill's second reading in the Senate, Senator John B. Cooke objected to waiving the at-length reading, thereby invoking his constitutional right to have the bill read in full.
- Initially, two Senate staffers began reading the bill aloud at an intelligible pace, continuing for approximately three and a half hours.
- Senate Secretary Cindi Markwell then directed staff to stop the human reading and instead use technology.
- Senate staff uploaded the bill to between four and six computers, which then used automated software to recite different portions of the bill simultaneously at a speed of about 650 words per minute.
- The simultaneous, high-speed computerized recitation created a cacophony of unintelligible sounds.
- Senators Cooke, Robert S. Gardner, and Chris Holbert requested that Senate President Leroy M. Garcia, Jr. and Secretary Markwell slow down the computers to an understandable pace, but they refused.
- The unintelligible computerized process continued for approximately four hours until the entire bill had been processed.
Procedural Posture:
- Senators Cooke, Gardner, and Holbert filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief against Senate President Garcia and Secretary Markwell in Denver District Court.
- The district court granted a temporary restraining order against the petitioners.
- Following a hearing, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the computerized reading violated the constitution.
- The district court later made the injunction permanent and issued a declaratory judgment requiring the Senate to read all future legislation 'in an intelligible manner and at an understandable speed' upon request.
- Petitioners Garcia and Markwell appealed the district court's final order to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
- The parties filed a joint motion for direct review by the Colorado Supreme Court, which the court granted.
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Issue:
Does using multiple computers to simultaneously recite different portions of a bill at a high, unintelligible speed satisfy the Colorado Constitution's requirement in Article V, Section 22 that a bill be 'read at length'?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Samour
No, the use of multiple computers to simultaneously recite different portions of a bill at a high, unintelligible speed does not satisfy the constitutional requirement that a bill be 'read at length.' Examining both contemporaneous and modern dictionary definitions, the court found that the unintelligible cacophony produced by the computers did not align with any ordinary or popular meaning of the word 'read,' which implies uttering words in a proper order so they can be understood. This method also undermined the animating purpose of the reading requirement, which is to afford protection from hasty legislation and prevent fraud or trickery in the enactment of bills. However, while it is the judiciary's role to interpret the constitution and declare that this method was non-compliant, the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the court from dictating the specific form or manner by which the legislature must comply in the future. Therefore, the district court erred by issuing an injunction that prescribed how the Senate must conduct future readings.
Dissenting - Justice Márquez
Yes, the legislature's method did satisfy the constitutional requirement. The plain language of Article V, Section 22 simply requires a bill to be 'read,' which means uttered aloud, and does not specify requirements for intelligibility, speed, sequence, or the use of a human voice. The majority improperly adds new requirements to the constitution without justification. This interpretation should defer to the legislature's longstanding practical construction of its own internal procedures. The historical purpose of the reading requirement was to inform illiterate legislators, a function that is now largely ceremonial. The majority's decision offers no clear guidance for future compliance and improperly calls into question the validity of past legislation enacted after similar multi-voice readings.
Dissenting - Justice Hood
Yes, the legislature's action should be upheld, and the judiciary should show greater deference. To the extent the term 'read' is ambiguous, courts must give 'great deference' to the legislative branch's interpretation of constitutional provisions governing its own internal procedures. The Senate's method arguably complied with the text and purpose of the reading requirement, and the court's role is not to review such procedural decisions de novo. Furthermore, the district court's issuance of pre-enactment injunctive relief was improper, as such judicial interference with the legislative process is only warranted in 'extraordinary circumstances,' which were not present here. The majority's decision, while claiming to respect the separation of powers, undermines it by micromanaging legislative procedure.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the judiciary's role as the ultimate interpreter of constitutional procedural requirements for legislation, affirming that such issues are justiciable and not purely political questions. However, it also strongly reinforces the principle of separation of powers by drawing a clear line between permissible judicial review and impermissible judicial command. The court established that it can invalidate a legislative method that violates the constitution ('what not to do') but cannot prescribe a specific method of compliance ('what to do'). This creates a precedent that allows for judicial oversight of legislative processes while preserving the legislature's autonomy to determine its own internal rules and methods within constitutional bounds.
