v. Colorado Cab Company LLC
2019 COA 3 (2019)
Rule of Law:
For the rescue doctrine to apply in Colorado, a plaintiff must have physically intervened, displaying bodily movement and effort to rescue the imperiled person, rather than merely verbally interceding.
Facts:
- Late one night, cab driver Ali Yusuf picked up Curt Glinton and Glinton’s friend in Denver; both passengers appeared intoxicated.
- Glinton and his friend could not provide an address and directed Yusuf turn-by-turn where to drive.
- When they stopped, Glinton yelled and cursed at Yusuf over the $6.50 fare, then grabbed and punched Yusuf from behind.
- Jose Garcia, who had called for a cab, saw a taxi he thought was his own drive by near his brother's house and followed it for several blocks.
- Garcia approached Yusuf’s stopped taxi, heard Glinton and Yusuf arguing, and verbally told Glinton to leave Yusuf alone and for both to stop fighting.
- Glinton then apparently attacked Garcia, hitting him on the head.
- Glinton then drove off in the taxi, abruptly turned around, and drove toward Garcia and Yusuf, hitting Garcia with the cab, running him over, and dragging him down the street.
- Garcia sustained extensive injuries, including shattered ear drums, a traumatic brain injury, a fractured eye socket, and broken ribs.
Procedural Posture:
- Jose Garcia sued Colorado Cab Company and Ali Yusuf in City and County of Denver District Court (trial court) for negligence and unjust enrichment.
- Garcia dropped his claims against Yusuf at trial.
- Colorado Cab Company moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed Garcia no duty of care and that proximate cause was absent; the district court denied this motion.
- At trial, Colorado Cab Company twice moved for a directed verdict based on the same arguments; the district court denied those motions as well.
- The jury found in favor of Garcia on the negligence claim, and the district court entered judgment against Colorado Cab Company.
- Colorado Cab Company moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; the district court denied this motion, reasoning that a common-carrier/passenger relationship, a duty to Yusuf as an employee, and the rescue doctrine supported imposing liability.
- Colorado Cab Company appealed the district court's determination that it owed Garcia a duty of care to the Colorado Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Does the rescue doctrine, which extends a defendant's liability to a plaintiff who attempts to rescue someone in danger due to the defendant's alleged negligence, require the plaintiff to have physically intervened, displaying bodily movement and effort to save the person, to qualify as a rescuer, and did a common-carrier/passenger relationship create a duty of care to a person who mistakenly followed a taxi and then verbally intervened in an altercation?
Opinions:
Majority - JUDGE J. JONES
No, the rescue doctrine does not apply to Garcia because he merely verbally interceded and did not physically intervene to save Yusuf; therefore, he does not qualify as a rescuer. Furthermore, no common-carrier/passenger relationship existed between Colorado Cab Company and Garcia to establish a duty of care. The court explained that this case involves nonfeasance (failure to prevent harm) rather than misfeasance (active misconduct), requiring a 'special relationship' for a duty to exist. Regarding the common-carrier/passenger relationship, the court found no evidence that Garcia was a passenger or even a prospective passenger of Yusuf’s cab. It was mere coincidence that Garcia had called for a cab and followed Yusuf’s taxi, and he discovered the altercation while still at least half a block away. This scenario does not establish the heightened duty of care owed by a common carrier, distinguishing it from Publix Cab Co. v. Fessler, where a duty arose from providing an unsafe boarding location for an awaiting passenger. Regarding the rescue doctrine, the court acknowledged that Yusuf was in imminent peril but emphasized that the doctrine requires a rescuer to take 'concrete physical action — that is, some bodily movement and effort — to save the other person from imminent peril.' Citing examples like dashing in front of a vehicle or plunging into a stream, the court found Garcia’s actions, which consisted only of approaching the cab and verbally telling the individuals to stop fighting, did not constitute physical intervention. Since Garcia did not get between the men or try to pull one away, the rescue doctrine could not apply. Because neither basis for a duty was established, the district court erred in denying Colorado Cab’s motions.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the 'physical intervention' requirement for the rescue doctrine in Colorado, narrowing its application to instances of tangible, bodily effort rather than just verbal admonishment. By distinguishing between active intervention and mere verbal warning, the court limits the scope of a defendant's liability to rescuers, ensuring that future plaintiffs invoking the rescue doctrine must demonstrate an overt physical act of saving or attempting to save the imperiled individual. This ruling establishes a more stringent evidentiary standard for such claims and reinforces that special duties of care, such as those owed by common carriers, are strictly construed based on the direct relationship between the parties.
