Uss v. Town of Oyster Bay
37 N.Y.2d 639, 339 N.E. 2d 147, 376 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1975)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A trial court has broad discretion to permit an in-court demonstration using a model, even if the conditions are not substantially similar to the actual event, provided the dissimilarities are explained to the jury and the opposing party has an opportunity for cross-examination.
Facts:
- While an infant plaintiff was walking home from a date, his companion struck a metal street sign pole with his hand.
- A dual street sign assembly became dislodged from the top of the pole.
- The sign fell and struck the infant plaintiff on the head, causing injury.
- Following the incident, the infant plaintiff's father recovered the street sign.
Procedural Posture:
- The infant plaintiff sued the defendant town in a trial court for personal injuries.
- During a jury trial, the court, over the plaintiff's objection, permitted the defendant's counsel to conduct an in-court demonstration.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
- The plaintiffs (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The plaintiffs (appellant) then appealed to the Court of Appeals (the highest court).
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the trial court commit an error of law by permitting an in-court demonstration using a model pole that was not substantially similar to the pole involved in the accident?
Opinions:
Majority - Jones, J.
No. The trial court did not commit an error of law because the decision to admit such a demonstration falls within its broad discretion. While the court could have justifiably forbidden the demonstration due to the dissimilarities between the model pole and the original (e.g., height, embedment), it was not a legal error to allow it. The court determined that the plaintiff's interests were sufficiently protected by highlighting the differences to the jury and affording plaintiff's counsel an unrestricted opportunity for cross-examination to minimize the demonstration's significance. The court reasoned that the mechanics were within the average juror's comprehension, and the demonstration was not deceptive, sensational, or purely conjectural.
Dissenting - Cooke, J.
Yes. A courtroom demonstration should only be permitted if the conditions are identical or substantially the same as those at the time of the event. The substantial dissimilarities here—specifically the pole's height and embedment, and the lack of proof regarding the similarity of force applied—made the demonstration irrelevant and inadmissible as a matter of law. Because the demonstration was sufficiently prejudicial to the plaintiffs, the verdict should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the significant deference appellate courts grant to trial courts in evidentiary matters, particularly concerning courtroom demonstrations. It establishes that perfect or even 'substantially similar' conditions are not an absolute prerequisite for admissibility. Instead, the focus shifts to procedural safeguards, such as instructing the jury on dissimilarities and allowing robust cross-examination, trusting the jury to properly weigh the evidence's probative value. This lowers the bar for admitting demonstrative evidence compared to the stricter standard advocated by the dissent, favoring admissibility and jury discretion over a rigid exclusionary rule.
