USS-Posco Industries v. Edwards
20 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 449, 111 Cal.App.4th 436, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
An employer may obtain a workplace violence restraining order under California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.8 on behalf of an employee who is a logical target of generalized threats of violence, even if the threatening individual did not specifically name that employee.
Facts:
- On March 19, 2001, UPI manager Walter Rowell instructed employee Ezell Edwards to wear his safety glasses, which Edwards did not do.
- Rowell reported the non-compliance to Edwards's direct supervisor, Lynette Giacobazzi, who then spoke to Edwards about the safety violation.
- Later that day, Edwards approached Rowell and other managers, stating, "You know what time I get off. You know where the parking lot is at... We’ll just go out there and take care of this."
- Following this incident, Giacobazzi suspended Edwards for five days for using threatening language.
- After the suspension, several coworkers came forward with reports of other threats Edwards had made.
- Coworker Craig Pineda reported that Edwards had previously stated he would "come in gunning" and turn the company from "USS-POSCO to USS-Columbine."
- Coworker Manuel Nino reported that Edwards had told him he would warn certain people not to come to work if he was "ever going to do something."
- Coworker Darin Smith reported hearing Edwards list specific managers by name (not including Giacobazzi) and say, "I’ll kill all the motherfuckers," and also state that he kept a gun in his car. UPI subsequently terminated Edwards's employment.
Procedural Posture:
- USS-Posco Industries (UPI) filed a petition in trial court for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and an injunction against former employee Ezell Edwards, on behalf of supervisor Lynette Giacobazzi.
- The trial court granted the TRO.
- Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court issued a three-year injunction against Edwards, finding clear and convincing evidence of credible threats of violence.
- Edwards filed a motion to modify the injunction, which the trial court denied.
- Edwards appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.8 permit an employer to obtain a workplace violence injunction on behalf of an employee who was not specifically named in a threat, but who is a logical target of generalized threats of workplace violence?
Opinions:
Majority - Parrilli, J.
Yes. California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.8 permits an employer to obtain an injunction on behalf of an employee who is a logical target of generalized threats, even if that employee was not specifically named. The court reasoned that the fundamental legislative purpose of the statute is to prevent workplace violence. A narrow, literal interpretation requiring a threat to be directed at a particular, named employee would lead to the absurd result of employers being unable to protect their workforce from an individual who makes indiscriminate threats, such as threatening to shoot employees on the premises. The court determined that Giacobazzi was a logical target for Edwards's retaliatory violence because she was his direct supervisor who initiated the disciplinary action that led to his suspension and termination. Therefore, even without a specific threat against her, the generalized threats of shooting up the workplace were sufficient to make her a credibly threatened employee under the statute.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of California's workplace violence prevention statute, establishing that protection is not limited to individually named targets. It empowers employers to act proactively by seeking injunctive relief for any employee who could be reasonably considered a target of generalized threats. The ruling signals a judicial preference for preventing potential mass-violence tragedies over a rigid, literalist interpretation of statutory language. This precedent lowers the burden for employers seeking such injunctions, as they no longer need to prove a direct, one-to-one threat against the specific employee they wish to protect, so long as that employee is a logical target.
