URL-provided case (name will be extracted)
2017 VT 4, 164 A.3d 658, 2016 VT 4 (2017)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Vermont law does not recognize a cause of action for private nuisance based solely on aesthetic considerations, reaffirming that an unsightly appearance, without more, does not constitute a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of property. Diminution in property value alone also does not establish a private nuisance.
Facts:
- Nancy Myrick, Dale Hastings, and Jess Whitney (landowners) resided in New Haven, Vermont.
- Their neighbors leased property to Peck Electric Company d/b/a Peck Solar, Encore Middlebury Solar I, LLC, Encore Redevelopment, LLC, Solarcommunities, Inc. d/b/a Suncommon, Sun CSA 6, LLC, and Helios Solar, LLC (solar companies).
- The solar companies constructed commercial solar arrays on the leased properties.
- The landowners claimed that the solar arrays negatively affected the surrounding area’s rural aesthetic.
- The landowners alleged that their properties consequently lost value due to the presence of the solar arrays.
Procedural Posture:
- Nancy Myrick filed suit in Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, against Peck Electric Company, Encore Middlebury Solar I, LLC, and Encore Redevelopment, LLC.
- Dale Hastings and Jess Whitney filed a separate suit in the same court against Solarcommunities, Inc., Sun CSA 6, LLC, and Helios Solar, LLC.
- The trial court (Superior Court, Civil Division) consolidated the two cases.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the solar companies, concluding that Vermont precedent (Woodstock Burying Ground Ass’n v. Hager) barred nuisance actions based purely on aesthetics.
- The landowners (appellants) appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Vermont Supreme Court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Vermont law recognize a cause of action for private nuisance based solely on aesthetic disapproval or diminution in property value, rather than on a physical interference with the use and enjoyment of property?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Eaton
No, Vermont law does not recognize a private nuisance cause of action based solely on aesthetic considerations or diminution in property value. The Court affirmed Vermont’s long-standing rule, established in Woodstock Burying Ground Ass’n v. Hager (1896), that unsightliness alone does not constitute a nuisance. A private nuisance requires an "unreasonable and substantial" interference with the use and enjoyment of another's property. The Court reasoned that an unattractive sight, without more, is not a "substantial interference" as a matter of law because it does not affect a citizen’s ability to use and enjoy their land. Aesthetic preferences are inherently subjective and cannot be objectively quantified or measured by the unreasonableness standard of nuisance law, distinguishing them from traditional nuisance elements like noise, light, vibration, or odor. Allowing such claims would transform courts into arbiters of taste, a role better suited for legislative bodies through zoning laws. The Court noted that the "trend" in other jurisdictions towards recognizing aesthetic nuisance, mentioned in Coty v. Ramsey Assocs., Inc. (1988), has failed to materialize, with the majority of states declining to recognize such claims. The Court also clarified that diminution in property value alone is insufficient to establish a nuisance, distinguishing Allen v. Uni-First Corp. (1988) where diminished value was a measure of damages for an actual or threatened chemical contamination, not the harm itself. Allowing claims based solely on property value diminution due to a neighbor's activities would invite speculation and create a one-sided rule.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the boundaries of private nuisance law in Vermont, firmly rejecting purely aesthetic complaints and economic depreciation as independent grounds for a nuisance claim. By reaffirming the Hager precedent and distinguishing Uni-First, the Court limits judicial intervention in matters of taste and property value fluctuations, leaving such concerns primarily to legislative zoning or private restrictive covenants. This ruling promotes predictability in land use and prevents courts from becoming arbiters of subjective aesthetic preferences, while simultaneously encouraging property owners to utilize other legal mechanisms like zoning to address aesthetic concerns.
