University of Texas at Arlington v. Sandra Williams and Steve Williams
459 S.W.3d 48, 2015 Tex. LEXIS 268, 58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 514 (2015)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under the Texas Recreational Use Statute, the term 'recreation' does not include spectating at a competitive sporting event in a stadium. The statute's catchall provision for 'any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors' is limited by the principle of ejusdem generis to activities similar in type to those specifically enumerated, which primarily involve the enjoyment of property in a more natural state.
Facts:
- The University of Texas at Arlington (UTA) owned Maverick Stadium, a 12,500-seat multi-purpose facility.
- UTA leased the stadium to the Arlington Independent School District for events, including high school soccer games.
- Sandra Williams went to Maverick Stadium to watch her daughter's high school soccer game.
- After the game concluded, Williams walked down the stadium stairs to a guardrail separating the stands from the field to wait for her daughter.
- Williams leaned against a gate in the railing which had a broken latch and was secured by a chain and padlock.
- The gate unexpectedly swung open, causing Williams to fall five feet to the artificial turf below.
- Williams sustained injuries to her rib and left arm as a result of the fall.
Procedural Posture:
- Sandra Williams sued the University of Texas at Arlington (UTA) in a Texas state trial court for negligence and gross negligence.
- UTA filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss, asserting the Recreational Use Statute limited its liability to acts of gross negligence, thereby barring the ordinary negligence claim under sovereign immunity.
- The trial court denied UTA's plea and motion.
- UTA, as appellant, brought an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order, holding that spectating at a soccer game was not 'recreation' under the statute.
- UTA, as petitioner, sought and was granted review by the Supreme Court of Texas.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Texas Recreational Use Statute, which limits a landowner's liability for injuries sustained during 'recreation,' apply to a spectator at a high school soccer game?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Devine
No, the Texas Recreational Use Statute does not apply to a spectator at a competitive sporting event. Using the canon of ejusdem generis, the catchall provision 'any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors' must be interpreted in light of the specific activities listed in the statute, such as hunting, fishing, and hiking. These activities are pursuits that enjoy land in a more natural state. Spectating at an organized sporting event in a stadium is a 'celebration of organized human activity,' not the pursuit of nature. If the legislature had intended the catchall to cover all outdoor activities, it would not have needed to add other specific outdoor activities to the list in later amendments.
Concurring - Justice Guzman
No, the statute does not apply, but for a different reason. The analysis should focus on the precise activity the plaintiff was engaged in at the moment of injury, per City of Bellmead v. Torres. The soccer match had ended, and Williams was injured while 'attempting to acquire and sign forms authorizing a high school to release her daughter.' This administrative task is not 'recreation' under any interpretation of the statute. Therefore, the Court does not need to reach the broader question of whether spectating itself qualifies as recreation.
Concurring - Justice Boyd
No, the statute does not apply because it is ambiguous and must be strictly construed. The statute's definition of 'recreation' is a 'Gordian Knot' because the listed activities are too varied to establish a clear 'type' of activity. Because the statute abrogates a common-law right (the right to sue for ordinary negligence), it must be construed narrowly and only applied to cases 'clearly within its purview.' Since it is not clear that spectating at a soccer game falls under the statute, the statute should not be applied to bar the plaintiff's claim.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Johnson
Yes, the statute should apply. The plurality's reading is too narrow, ignoring that the statutory list is non-exclusive ('such as') and contains a broad catchall. There is no logical distinction between 'bird-watching,' which is explicitly included, and 'child-watching' at a soccer game. Furthermore, because UTA is a governmental unit, statutes waiving its sovereign immunity must be construed narrowly, which means a statute like this one that limits liability (and thus preserves immunity) should be applied broadly. Therefore, the statute should cover Williams's activity, barring her ordinary negligence claim.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of the Texas Recreational Use Statute's 'catchall' provision, limiting its application to activities akin to traditional, nature-based pursuits. It establishes that owners of developed facilities like sports stadiums likely cannot claim the statute's protection against negligence suits from spectators. The fractured court, with four separate opinions offering different rationales, highlights the statute's ambiguity and signals that the precise boundaries of 'recreation' will be a subject of future litigation. This case curtails the expansion of statutory immunity for landowners who host organized events, even if they occur outdoors.
