United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan
28 L. Ed. 2d 339, 401 US 576, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 131 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
The First Amendment protects the right of association for groups, including labor unions, to engage in collective activity to help their members secure effective and affordable legal representation, which includes recommending specific attorneys and negotiating fee caps on their behalf.
Facts:
- The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (the Union) established a plan to assist its members and their families with injury claims under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA).
- As part of this plan, the Union selected and recommended specific attorneys, designated as 'Legal Counsel,' to its injured members.
- The Union secured an agreement from these recommended attorneys that their maximum fee would not exceed 25% of any monetary recovery.
- The Union's staff would investigate accidents to gather evidence to help members in asserting their claims.
- Union representatives informed injured members about the availability of the designated Legal Counsel.
- Prior to 1959, the Union reimbursed its representatives for time and expenses incurred while transporting injured members or their families to the offices of the recommended attorneys.
Procedural Posture:
- The Michigan State Bar sued the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in a Michigan state trial court in 1959, seeking an injunction against the Union's legal assistance plan.
- The State Bar alleged the plan violated a state statute prohibiting the solicitation of damage suits.
- The state trial court issued an injunction in 1962 against the Union's activities.
- The Union appealed the injunction to the Michigan Supreme Court.
- While the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, a similar case.
- The Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to allow the State Bar to seek relief not inconsistent with the Virginia decision.
- On remand, the State Bar declined to amend its complaint, and the trial court ultimately entered a new injunction that mirrored the one from the Virginia case.
- The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's new injunction.
- The United Transportation Union, as successor to the Brotherhood, was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a state court injunction that prohibits a union from recommending specific lawyers, controlling their fees, and assisting members in contacting them, violate the members' First Amendment rights of free speech, petition, and association?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Black
Yes. The state court injunction violates the First Amendment. The common thread running through the Court's decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment. The injunction here is overly broad and infringes upon this right by prohibiting several protected activities. The prohibition on 'giving legal advice' would bar the union from employing counsel for its members, a right upheld in prior cases. The ban on furnishing information to attorneys obstructs the union's protected role in investigating accidents. Prohibiting compensation for representatives who transport members to a lawyer's office and banning agreements to cap legal fees at 25% both undermine the union's ability to ensure its members receive affordable and effective representation, which was the core right upheld in United Mine Workers.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mr. Justice Harlan
Partially yes, partially no. While the part of the injunction prohibiting the union from controlling attorney's fees cannot stand under the precedent of United Mine Workers, the remainder of the injunction is a valid exercise of the state's power to regulate the legal profession. The provision against 'giving legal advice' should be read narrowly to prohibit only the unauthorized practice of law by laymen, which is permissible. Prohibitions on furnishing names to lawyers and other anti-solicitation measures are appropriate to fend against 'ambulance chasing' and to ensure an injured worker has a truly free choice of counsel. The provisions against sharing fees are necessary to remove the temptation for union representatives to overbear a member's choice for financial reasons. The majority extends First Amendment protections too far into an area of state regulation.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mr. Justice White
Partially yes, partially no. The portion of the decree forbidding the setting of fees by a union-lawyer agreement is invalid under United Mine Workers. Additionally, the provision prohibiting the union from 'giving or furnishing legal advice' is overbroad and should be narrowed to prohibit only legal advice by nonlawyers. However, the remaining provisions of the injunction are consistent with prior case law and should be upheld. The Court should not extend its prior holdings to set aside the entire decree.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle established in NAACP v. Button and its progeny that collective action to secure legal representation is a fundamental right protected by the First Amendment. It significantly curtails the ability of states to use traditional regulations against solicitation and the unauthorized practice of law to dismantle group legal service plans. The ruling confirms that ensuring 'meaningful access to the courts' includes the right of groups to make legal services more affordable and accessible for their members, setting a major precedent that impacts the regulation of the legal profession and enables the growth of group legal plans by unions, employers, and other associations.
