United Steelworkers v. National Labor Relations Board
1964 U.S. LEXIS 2254, 376 U.S. 492, 11 L. Ed. 2d 863 (1964)
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Rule of Law:
Picketing an entrance to a struck employer's premises that is used exclusively by employees of a neutral company is lawful primary activity if the work performed by those neutral employees is related to the normal operations of the struck employer. The fact that the entrance is on property owned by the neutral company is not decisive so long as the picketing occurs at a situs proximate and related to the primary employer's day-to-day operations.
Facts:
- After failing to agree on a collective bargaining contract, the United Steelworkers of America union called a strike against Carrier Corporation on March 2, 1960.
- The union picketed the various entrances to Carrier's plant.
- Adjacent to Carrier's property was a railroad right-of-way, owned by the New York Central Railroad, which was used for deliveries to Carrier and three other companies.
- A railroad spur track crossed a public road and entered a fenced-in area through a gate accessible only to railroad employees; this fence enclosed both Carrier's property and the railroad right-of-way.
- The union picketed this railroad gate to disrupt deliveries and pickups for Carrier.
- On March 11, railroad supervisory personnel attempted to use the gate to deliver empty boxcars for Carrier's use and pick up cars Carrier wanted shipped out.
- The picketing strikers physically obstructed the train by standing on the engine, lying on the tracks, and parking a car on the track, directing threats at the operators.
Procedural Posture:
- Carrier Corporation filed unfair labor practice charges against the union with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
- The NLRB's Regional Director issued a complaint alleging the union violated §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act.
- An NLRB Trial Examiner found the union had violated both sections.
- On review, the full NLRB affirmed the § 8(b)(1)(A) violation but reversed on the § 8(b)(4)(B) charge, ruling the picketing was lawful primary activity.
- Carrier Corporation appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the NLRB's decision and found the picketing to be an illegal secondary boycott.
- The union, as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a union violate § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act by picketing an entrance, located on a neutral railroad's property but adjacent to the primary employer's plant, that is used exclusively by the railroad's employees to make deliveries and pickups essential to the primary employer's normal operations?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
No. The union's picketing of the railroad gate does not violate § 8(b)(4) because it qualifies as protected primary activity. The legality of picketing a separate gate used by neutral employees depends on the nature of the work performed by those employees. Citing its precedent in the General Electric case, the Court reasoned that if the duties of the neutral employees are connected with the normal, day-to-day operations of the struck employer, picketing directed at them is permissible primary activity. Here, the railroad's deliveries and pickups were essential to Carrier's regular operations. The location of the gate on railroad property was not a decisive factor, as the gate was adjacent to Carrier's plant and functioned as a plant entrance for these essential services. The Court also held that the violence accompanying the picketing, while potentially unlawful under other statutes, did not transform otherwise primary activity into a prohibited secondary boycott under § 8(b)(4), as that section is concerned with the objective of the picketing, not its method.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'related work' doctrine established in General Electric, clarifying that the test for lawful separate gate picketing focuses on the function of the work performed by the neutral employees, not the ownership of the property where the picketing occurs. It significantly empowers striking unions by confirming their right to apply economic pressure by disrupting logistical services that are essential to a primary employer's normal business. By separating the analysis of the picketing's objective (for § 8(b)(4) purposes) from its conduct (e.g., violence), the Court reinforced that the secondary boycott provision targets the aim of enmeshing neutral parties in unrelated disputes, not the method of protest in a primary dispute.
