United Steelworkers of America v. Weber
443 U.S. 193, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not prohibit private employers and unions from voluntarily implementing race-conscious affirmative action plans designed to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories, provided the plans are temporary and do not unnecessarily trammel the interests of non-minority employees.
Facts:
- In 1974, United Steelworkers of America (USWA) and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (Kaiser) entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included an affirmative action plan.
- The plan was designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in Kaiser's skilled craftwork forces, which were almost exclusively white.
- At Kaiser's plant in Gramercy, Louisiana, only 1.83% of skilled craftworkers were black, while the local labor force was approximately 39% black.
- The plan reserved 50% of the openings in a new in-plant craft-training program for black employees until the percentage of black craftworkers in the plant approximated that of the local labor force.
- Selection for the training program was based on seniority within separate racial lists for white and black employees.
- Brian Weber, a white production worker, applied for the training program at the Gramercy plant.
- Weber was not selected for the program, while several black employees with less seniority were admitted under the 50% reservation.
- Prior to 1974, Kaiser had hired only craftworkers with prior experience, a practice that disproportionately excluded black workers who had historically been barred from craft unions.
Procedural Posture:
- Brian Weber instituted a class-action lawsuit against Kaiser and USWA in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
- The District Court held that the affirmative action plan violated Title VII and entered a judgment in favor of Weber's class, permanently enjoining Kaiser and USWA from enforcing the racial quota.
- Kaiser and USWA, as appellants, appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that all employment preferences based on race violated Title VII.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbid private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing to a race-conscious affirmative action plan that reserves 50% of openings in a training program for black employees to remedy a manifest racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
No. Title VII does not forbid private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide, race-conscious affirmative action plans to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories. A literal interpretation of §§ 703(a) and (d) must be read against the background of the statute's legislative history and purpose, which was to address 'the plight of the Negro in our economy' and open employment opportunities in jobs traditionally closed to them. It would be ironic to interpret a law designed to remedy racial injustice as a bar to all voluntary efforts to achieve that goal. Further, § 703(j) states that Title VII does not 'require' employers to grant preferential treatment to correct racial imbalances, but it notably does not say it does not 'permit' it, suggesting Congress intended to allow voluntary measures. The Kaiser plan is permissible because it mirrors the statute's purpose, does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees (e.g., it does not require their discharge and half of trainees are white), and is a temporary measure to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
No. A voluntary affirmative action plan is permissible if it is a reasonable response to an 'arguable violation' of Title VII. This practical approach addresses the 'high tightrope' employers face: potential liability for past discrimination against minorities on one hand, and potential liability for reverse discrimination against whites on the other. Allowing employers to remedy arguable violations without a formal judicial finding of discrimination encourages voluntary compliance, a key purpose of the Act. Although the majority's 'traditionally segregated job categories' standard is broader, it is an acceptable interpretation because it equitably permits employers to address the effects of societal, pre-Act discrimination for which Title VII itself provides no direct remedy.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Burger
Yes. The collectively bargained plan is forbidden by the explicit language of Title VII. The Court's decision is contrary to the statute's plain language and is an act of judicial legislation rather than interpretation. Section 703(d) of the Act is extraordinarily clear that it is unlawful to 'discriminate against any individual because of his race' in admission to training programs. The quota in the agreement unquestionably discriminates on the basis of race against Brian Weber and is therefore an unlawful employment practice. If such affirmative action programs are to be permitted, it is the role of Congress, not the Court, to amend the statute.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
Yes. The Court's decision is a dramatic and unremarked switch that eludes clear statutory language, 'uncontradicted' legislative history, and uniform precedent. The plain language of §§ 703(a) and (d) prohibits all racial discrimination in employment, without exception. The legislative history irrefutably demonstrates that both proponents and opponents of Title VII understood and agreed that the Act forbade preferential treatment for any race. Section 703(j) was added to ensure the Act would not be interpreted to 'require' racial balancing, not to create a negative pregnant that 'permits' it. By ignoring the legislative record, the Court introduces into Title VII the very evil of racial preferences that the law was intended to eradicate.
Analysis:
This decision established a landmark precedent by interpreting Title VII to permit voluntary, private, race-conscious affirmative action plans, moving away from a strict, literal reading of the statute's anti-discrimination provisions. It legitimized affirmative action as a tool to remedy broad societal discrimination, not just proven, specific instances of illegal conduct by a particular employer. The Court's 'spirit of the law' approach created a framework for permissible affirmative action that is temporary and does not unduly harm non-minorities, profoundly shaping employment law and corporate diversity practices for decades.
