United States v. Zapata
18 F.3d 971 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A slight, brief, and non-coercive physical touching of a suspect by a police officer during an otherwise lawful investigatory stop does not, by itself, transform the stop into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.
Facts:
- Following a tip from a reliable informant about narcotics activity, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents began surveillance on a house in Lowell, Massachusetts.
- Agents observed Walter Dejesus Zapata drive from the surveilled location, go to another house, and help load two duffel bags into the trunk of a second car.
- Zapata then drove the second car in an erratic and evasive manner, including weaving, changing lanes, and alternating speeds.
- Zapata swerved sharply into a highway rest area without signaling, at which point authorities had confirmed the car he was driving was unregistered and uninsured.
- Zapata entered a fast-food restaurant inside the rest area.
- Four law enforcement officers approached Zapata inside the restaurant, and one officer, Trooper Doekrey, placed his palm on Zapata's back for two to three seconds while politely asking him to move to a more secluded corner to talk.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging Zapata with conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and the underlying substantive offense.
- In the U.S. District Court (trial court), Zapata filed a motion to suppress the cocaine and his subsequent statements, claiming an illegal search and seizure.
- After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Zapata's motion to suppress.
- A jury convicted Zapata on both counts.
- Zapata appealed the denial of his suppression motion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a police officer's slight physical touching of a suspect, such as placing a palm on their back for a few seconds to guide them, automatically convert a lawful investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause?
Opinions:
Majority - Selya, Circuit Judge
No. A slight physical touching by a police officer during a lawful investigatory stop does not, in itself, transform the encounter into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause. The court reasoned that Zapata's reliance on California v. Hodari D. was misplaced. Hodari D. used the term 'arrest' in its common law sense, synonymous with a 'seizure,' but did not distinguish between different types of seizures, such as a Terry stop versus a full arrest. The court emphasized that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, beginning with Terry v. Ohio, has long recognized that an investigatory stop may involve some degree of physical coercion or contact, such as a protective pat-down, without requiring probable cause. The distinction between a stop and a de facto arrest depends on the totality of the circumstances, and here, the officers' polite demeanor, the public setting, the absence of brandished weapons, and the minimal nature of the physical contact supported the district court's finding that a reasonable person would not have felt they were under arrest.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the Supreme Court's ruling in California v. Hodari D., establishing that it did not alter the foundational principles of Terry v. Ohio. The case reinforces that the analysis of whether a seizure has escalated from an investigatory stop to a de facto arrest remains a fact-intensive inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances, not a rigid rule triggered by any physical contact. This precedent provides law enforcement with the understanding that minimal, non-coercive physical contact used to manage a lawful stop does not automatically invalidate the encounter, preserving a degree of practical flexibility for officers in the field.
