United States v. Young
105 F.3d 1 (1997)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A police officer's de minimis physical contact with a suspect, made in response to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a concern for safety, does not elevate a lawful investigative stop into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.
Facts:
- Boston Police Officers James Fee and Robert Twitchell received a radio broadcast describing three armed robbery suspects.
- The officers observed a group of three men, including Dwayne Young, who partially matched the description.
- Upon seeing the officers' unmarked cruiser, the group dispersed, with Young walking away by himself.
- The officers pulled alongside Young, identified themselves, and asked if he had a minute, to which Young agreed.
- As Young approached the rear of the cruiser, both officers observed the handle of a handgun protruding from his waistband.
- Officer Twitchell lunged at Young through the cruiser's window, making fleeting physical contact but failing to detain him.
- Young turned and fled on foot, with Officer Twitchell in pursuit.
- During the pursuit, Twitchell saw Young remove the gun from his waistband and throw it into a basement stairwell, where it was later recovered.
Procedural Posture:
- Dwayne Young was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- Prior to trial, Young filed a motion in the U.S. District Court to suppress the gun, arguing it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
- The district court denied Young's motion to suppress the gun.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Young on the firearm charge.
- Young, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, challenging the district court's denial of his suppression motion.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a police officer's minimal, fleeting physical contact with a suspect during an encounter transform a lawful investigative stop into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause?
Opinions:
Majority - Stahl, J.
No, a police officer's minimal, fleeting physical contact does not transform a lawful investigative stop into a de facto arrest. The initial interaction between the officers and Young was a consensual encounter that did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections. The encounter escalated to a seizure, specifically an investigative stop, only when Officer Twitchell lunged at Young. This seizure was justified because the officers had developed reasonable suspicion based on several factors, culminating in their observation of a firearm in Young's waistband. The lunge was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances, as it was a reaction to a significant concern for officer and public safety. This minimal physical contact did not impose restraints comparable to a formal arrest, as Young's freedom of movement was not curtailed and a reasonable person in his position would not have understood the situation to be tantamount to an arrest. Therefore, the seizure was a lawful investigative stop, not a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary between an investigative stop and a de facto arrest, particularly when minimal physical force is used. It reinforces the principle that not all physical contact between an officer and a citizen constitutes an arrest, thereby giving officers some latitude to take reasonable safety precautions based on articulable suspicion. The court's fact-intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances approach emphasizes that the degree of restraint is a key factor in the analysis. This precedent is significant for future Fourth Amendment cases involving brief physical interactions, as it supports the legality of limited protective actions by police that fall short of a full-scale arrest.
Unlock the full brief for United States v. Young