United States v. Wulff
758 F.2d 1121 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
A felony conviction under a strict liability statute for an offense that is not a traditional common law crime violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if the penalty is severe and the conviction causes grave reputational harm.
Facts:
- Robert Wulff offered to sell a necklace.
- The necklace was made of talons from a red-tailed hawk and a great-horned owl.
- Both the red-tailed hawk and the great-horned owl are species protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
- Wulff sold the necklace to an undercover special agent of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Robert Wulff with violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
- In the U.S. District Court, Wulff moved to strike the word 'knowingly' from the indictment, and the United States consented.
- Wulff then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that imposing a felony conviction without proof of guilty knowledge violated due process.
- The district court agreed with Wulff and, after a motion by the United States, dismissed the felony indictment.
- The United States, as the appellant, appealed the district court's dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; Wulff is the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a felony conviction under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), a statute that does not require proof of scienter (guilty knowledge), violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Milburn, Circuit Judge
Yes, the felony provision of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, § 707(b)(2), is unconstitutional because it violates the Due Process Clause. The court reasoned that while strict liability offenses are sometimes permissible for regulatory crimes (malum prohibitum), they are generally limited to misdemeanors with minor penalties. The court adopted the test from Holdridge v. United States, which permits the elimination of criminal intent only where the penalty is relatively small and the conviction does not gravely besmirch one's reputation. The MBTA's felony provision fails this test because its penalties—up to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine—are not small. Furthermore, a felony conviction causes irreparable damage to a person's reputation and results in the loss of significant civil rights, such as the right to vote, serve on a jury, and possess a firearm. Because the crime is not one known to the common law, the court could not imply a scienter requirement and was therefore compelled to declare the strict liability felony provision unconstitutional.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant due process limitation on Congress's power to create strict liability felonies for regulatory offenses. It affirms the principle that severe punishment should generally be reserved for offenses committed with a culpable mental state. By invalidating the felony provision of the MBTA, the court protects individuals from facing harsh penalties and lifelong stigma for conduct they may not have known was illegal. This case serves as a key precedent for challenging other strict liability statutes that impose substantial criminal penalties, requiring legislatures to either include a mens rea element or limit the punishment to a misdemeanor level for such offenses.
