United States v. William Weiland
420 F.3d 1062, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18149, 68 Fed. R. Serv. 64 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A state law enforcement official who has a 'Special Deputation Appointment' from the U.S. Marshals Service qualifies as a 'federal law enforcement officer' authorized to request a federal search warrant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. Additionally, a routine certification by the custodian of a domestic public record is not 'testimonial' in nature and its admission does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Facts:
- Spokane County Sheriff’s Office Detective Michael D. Ricketts held a 'Special Deputation Appointment' from the U.S. Marshals Service.
- This appointment, sponsored by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), specifically authorized Ricketts to seek and execute federal search warrants in support of a federal task force.
- On February 19, 2003, Ricketts prepared a warrant affidavit based on information from other deputies and presented it to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, who reviewed and initialed it.
- Ricketts then applied for and received a federal search warrant from a U.S. magistrate judge for the home of William Weiland.
- Later that day, law enforcement officers executed the warrant at Weiland's property.
- During the search, officers seized a 9 mm Hi-Point Rifle, a .22 caliber Winchester rifle, and ammunition.
Procedural Posture:
- William Weiland was charged in U.S. District Court with being a felon in possession of firearms and with forfeiture.
- Weiland filed a pretrial motion to suppress the firearms, arguing the search warrant was invalidly obtained by a state officer in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.
- The district court denied the motion to suppress.
- At trial, the government introduced a 'penitentiary packet' with four prior Oklahoma convictions, to which Weiland objected on authentication, hearsay, Confrontation Clause, and undue prejudice grounds.
- The district court overruled the objections and admitted the evidence.
- A jury found Weiland guilty.
- The district court sentenced Weiland to 188 months imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act.
- Weiland (Appellant) appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a state law enforcement officer who has a 'Special Deputation Appointment' from the U.S. Marshals Service qualify as a 'federal law enforcement officer' authorized to request a federal search warrant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b)?
Opinions:
Majority - Gould, J.
Yes. A state law enforcement official with a deputation as a Special Deputy U.S. Marshal is a 'federal law enforcement officer' for the purposes of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. Ricketts's position made him a 'government agent ... engaged in enforcing the criminal laws' as authorized by the Attorney General. The court reasoned that federal statutes authorize U.S. Marshals to deputize local officers and to seek federal warrants, and Ricketts was acting in this deputized capacity when he applied for the warrant. Furthermore, even if a Rule 41 violation had occurred, suppression would be inappropriate because the violation was not of constitutional magnitude, it did not prejudice Weiland (as a state warrant could have been obtained), and Ricketts did not act in intentional disregard of the rule. The court also held that while the district court erred in admitting records of Weiland's prior convictions under the business records exception and abused its discretion by admitting four convictions instead of one, the records were admissible as self-authenticating public records, and their admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause because routine certifications are not 'testimonial' under Crawford v. Washington. The error of admitting superfluous convictions was deemed harmless.
Dissenting - Tashima, J.
The dissent does not address the Rule 41 issue but argues that Weiland's conviction should be reversed because the records of his prior convictions were not properly authenticated. The dissent contends that the majority ignored a facsimile transmittal included with the 'penitentiary packet' which demonstrated the unreliability of the certification. This fax, from an employee in the certifying official's office, requested copies of Weiland's records from another state agency. This contradicts the official's sworn certification that he had legal custody of the original records and had compared the copies to the originals. Because the certification is demonstrably unreliable, the records it purports to authenticate should not have been admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 902(2) and 902(4).
Analysis:
This case provides significant clarification on the authority of state and local officers participating in federal task forces. By holding that a special deputation confers 'federal law enforcement officer' status under Rule 41, the court streamlines the process for cross-deputized officers to obtain federal warrants, facilitating federal-state cooperation in criminal investigations. The decision also contributes to post-Crawford jurisprudence by establishing that routine, non-adversarial certifications of public records are not 'testimonial,' thus preventing Confrontation Clause challenges from bogging down the admission of essential documentary evidence like prior convictions. This holding is crucial for prosecutors who rely on such records to prove elements of an offense or for sentencing enhancements.
