United States v. William Riley Simpson
152 F.3d 1241, 98 Colo. J. C.A.R. 4348, 49 Fed. R. Serv. 1631 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A search warrant affidavit provides sufficient probable cause for a search for child pornography when, based on the totality of the circumstances, it establishes a fair probability that such evidence will be found, even if the affidavit uses the general term "child pornography" without describing the specific sexual content of the images.
Facts:
- An undercover FBI agent, Doug Rehman, communicated online with an individual named "Stavron" in an internet chat room called "Kidsexpics."
- "Stavron" identified himself as "B. Simpson" and provided a street address and email address belonging to the defendant, William Riley Simpson.
- During their conversation, Simpson discussed possessing child pornography and agreed to send Rehman a computer diskette containing "numerous scenes of prepubescent children under the age of thirteen" and $30 in exchange for a video.
- Simpson later backed out of the deal via email, stating he was afraid to use the U.S. mail to send the illegal diskette.
- Detective Steve Johnson verified that Simpson lived at the address provided to Agent Rehman and prepared an affidavit seeking a warrant to search the premises.
- Upon executing the warrant at Simpson's house, police seized a computer, diskettes, and papers near the computer containing Agent Rehman's undercover name ("FlaHawk") and contact information.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted William Riley Simpson on two counts of receiving child pornography.
- Simpson filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his home, arguing the search warrant was invalid.
- The U.S. District Court held a hearing and denied the motion to suppress.
- Following a trial, a jury found Simpson guilty on both counts.
- Simpson filed a motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence, which the district court denied.
- Simpson appealed his conviction and the denial of his pre-trial and post-trial motions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a search warrant affidavit that uses the general term "child pornography" without providing specific descriptions of the illicit materials' content establish sufficient probable cause for a search, as required by the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Anderson, J.
Yes, the search warrant affidavit established sufficient probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. Under the totality of the circumstances test from Illinois v. Gates, an issuing judge must find a 'fair probability' that evidence of a crime will be found. The court affords great deference to this determination. The term 'child pornography' is considered adequate to convey the nature of the material sought, as its meaning is commonly understood. The affidavit, which described Simpson's agreement to trade a disk of 'prepubescent children under the age of thirteen' in a 'kidssexpics' chat room, combined with his expressed fear of using the mail, provided a substantial basis for the judge to find probable cause that Simpson possessed such illegal materials.
Concurring - Kelly, Jr., J.
Yes, the affidavit established probable cause, but on narrower grounds. The majority's reliance on cases concerning the particularity of a warrant is misplaced in a probable cause analysis, as a judge requires sufficient factual detail to make an independent determination, not just a conclusory label like 'child pornography.' However, the totality of the circumstances here still supports a finding of probable cause. These circumstances include the defendant's agreement to trade images of 'prepubescent children,' the name of the chat room ('kidsexpics'), and evidence of guilty knowledge, such as his fear of using the mail and arranging for the return video to be disguised.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that the term 'child pornography' in a warrant affidavit can be sufficient to establish probable cause, especially when corroborated by circumstantial evidence of the suspect's knowledge and intent. The court extends the logic from cases on warrant particularity, which governs the scope of the search, to the initial probable cause determination for issuing the warrant. However, the concurrence highlights a potential doctrinal weakness, cautioning against allowing law enforcement to rely on conclusory terms instead of providing specific facts for a magistrate's independent review. This creates a point of contention for future litigation over the sufficiency of affidavits in similar cases.
