United States v. William Kiyuyung
171 F.3d 78, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3764, 1999 WL 141809 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
To satisfy the 'plain view' exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the government bears the burden of proving that the discovering officer was lawfully in the position from which the evidence was viewed, a burden that cannot be met by the testimony of a different officer who did not witness the initial discovery.
Facts:
- New York City police officers Paul Abousamra and Eladio Quiles arrested Curlene Branch for driving a car reported as stolen.
- After her arrest, Branch, who was not handcuffed, asked the officers to let her use the bathroom in the apartment she shared with William Kiyuyung.
- The officers agreed and escorted her into the apartment.
- Inside, Officer Abousamra conducted a quick visual security check of the apartment, including the hallway and bathroom, to ensure officer safety, but he did not see any guns.
- After Abousamra's check, Branch was allowed to enter the bathroom.
- While Branch was in the bathroom, Officer Quiles, who was positioned outside the bathroom door, called Abousamra over to show him a firearm he had just found on a shelf in an adjacent closet.
- Abousamra then looked at the shelves and saw two additional firearms, also in plain view.
- When Branch exited the bathroom, she stated the guns belonged to Kiyuyung, who later arrived and also claimed ownership.
Procedural Posture:
- William Kiyuyung was charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York with being a felon in possession of firearms.
- Kiyuyung filed a motion to suppress the firearms, arguing they were found during an unconstitutional search.
- The district court held a suppression hearing and denied Kiyuyung's motion, finding the seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine.
- Following the ruling, Kiyuyung waived his right to a jury and proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts, where he was found guilty.
- Kiyuyung (appellant) appealed the conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, challenging the district court's denial of his suppression motion.
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Issue:
Does the government meet its burden of proving the 'plain view' exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement when it fails to present testimony from the officer who first discovered the incriminating evidence, and relies solely on the testimony of another officer who only saw the evidence after being alerted to its discovery?
Opinions:
Majority - Kearse, Circuit Judge
No. The government did not meet its burden to show that the warrantless seizure of the guns was justified by the plain view exception. The government has the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls within a recognized exception. For the plain view exception to apply, the government must establish, among other things, that the officer was lawfully in a position from which to view the object. Here, the government's only witness was Officer Abousamra, who did not see the guns during his initial, lawful security sweep. The officer who actually discovered the first gun, Officer Quiles, did not testify. Abousamra could not testify from personal knowledge how Quiles discovered the gun; he only knew that after Quiles found it, it was then in plain view. Without Quiles's testimony, there was no evidence to establish that the closet doors were open or that Quiles was otherwise lawfully in a position to see the first gun. Therefore, the government failed to prove the initial discovery was lawful, and the evidence must be suppressed.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the government's stringent burden of proof when invoking exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. It establishes that the government cannot satisfy the 'plain view' doctrine through the second-hand testimony of an officer who did not make the initial discovery. The ruling pressures prosecutors to present direct testimony from the discovering officer, preventing them from succeeding on suppression motions with incomplete or hearsay evidence regarding the circumstances of the discovery. This precedent makes it more difficult for the government to justify a 'plain view' seizure if the key witnessing officer is unavailable or fails to testify.
