United States v. William J. Stoecker
215 F.3d 788, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12009, 54 Fed. R. Serv. 1030 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court's evidentiary rulings regarding witness credibility, admission of prior consistent statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), and summary exhibits under Fed.R.Evid. 1006 are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with prior consistent statements admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper motive if made before such motive arose. For convictions post-April 24, 1996, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act makes restitution mandatory, without regard to the defendant's ability to pay at the time of imposition.
Facts:
- William Stoecker was the sole owner of the Grabill Corporation, which held stock for four other holding companies that owned subsidiary operating companies.
- Stoecker orchestrated a major bank fraud scheme involving presenting false financial statements and pledging the same stock as collateral to more than one bank.
- As a result of Stoecker's scheme, eight banks loaned Grabill $150 million.
- By December 1988, Grabill Corporation could not meet its loan repayment obligations.
- After a bankruptcy trustee sold the companies' assets and distributed the proceeds, the banks were left with a loss of more than $82 million.
Procedural Posture:
- On March 4, 1997, a jury found William Stoecker guilty on numerous counts of bank fraud, making false statements to financial institutions, and giving or receiving bribes in exchange for procuring loans.
- Stoecker was sentenced to 90 months imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and $121,652,607.00 in restitution.
- Stoecker appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by limiting cross-examination of a government witness, admitting prior consistent statements, admitting summary charts, and ordering restitution without considering the defendant's ability to pay?
Opinions:
Majority - Bauer, Circuit Judge
No, the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of its challenged rulings regarding cross-examination, admission of evidence, or restitution. The court first affirmed the district court's decision to limit cross-examination of government witness Richard Bock regarding a 15-year-old administrative complaint. Under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b), specific instances of conduct for attacking credibility are discretionary, and their probative value must outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. The court found the DRE complaint too remote, lacking a final assessment of guilt, and unfairly prejudicial, noting that even a conviction over ten years old would generally be inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 609(b). Second, the court upheld the admission of Bock's 1991 statements to FBI investigators as prior consistent statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). Applying the four-part test, the court determined that Stoecker's cross-examination implied Bock fabricated his testimony due to his plea agreement, and crucially, Bock's 1991 statements were made approximately four to five years before the indictment and plea agreement, thereby predating any motive to fabricate. This aligns with United States v. Tome which supports consistent statements predating the motive to lie. Third, the court found no abuse of discretion in admitting five stock pledge charts under Fed.R.Evid. 1006. These charts summarized voluminous financial writings detailing stock pledges, serving as an aid to the jury in a long trial without conveniently examinable underlying documents, a practice supported by United States v. Swanquist and United States v. Robbins. Finally, the court affirmed the restitution order. Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, which applied to Stoecker's 1997 conviction, restitution is mandatory, and a defendant's inability to pay is considered only when setting up a payment schedule, not when imposing the restitution order itself, as established in United States v. Newman.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of evidentiary rules governing witness impeachment and rehabilitation, particularly Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) concerning prior consistent statements, reinforcing the critical timing requirement that such statements must predate any motive to fabricate. It also highlights the trial court's broad discretion in managing the admission of evidence, including complex summaries, to prevent unfair prejudice or confusion. Furthermore, the decision solidifies the mandatory nature of restitution under the MVRA for post-1996 convictions, removing judicial discretion based on a defendant's ability to pay at the time of sentencing, thereby ensuring victims are compensated.
