United States v. William E. "Jack" Street

Majority - Friedman, Senior Circuit Judge

Yes, Street's actions constituted separate violations, and the elements of the statute were met, and the sentencing enhancement was proper. The court affirmed Street's conviction and sentence, rejecting all his contentions. First, the indictment was not duplicitous. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) defines a single crime with several ways of committing it (assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering), not multiple distinct offenses. Congress intended a broad prohibition against harm or threats to federal officials, and alleging these acts conjunctively in one count is permissible, with proof of any one sufficient for conviction. Second, the indictment was not multiplicitous. Street's actions constituted two separate and successive assaults against Ranger Coe and Ranger Bisehoff, rather than a single act causing multiple injuries. He specifically confronted Coe, then left Coe to confront Bisehoff with new threats, and later directed his son to attack Coe while he would attack Bisehoff. This behavior is analogous to cases where a defendant gives "individual attention" to multiple officers in succession. Third, the district court properly admitted evidence of Street's armed confrontation with Agent Ford under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). This incident, immediately following the confrontation with the rangers, was relevant to proving Street's intent, a contested element. It showed his willingness to use force against government officers, rebutting his claim of merely "mouthing around." The jury was instructed on the limited purpose of this evidence. Fourth, Ranger Coe's written report was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B). After cross-examination implied Coe's trial testimony was a recent fabrication, the report, prepared shortly after the incident and consistent with his testimony, was admissible to rebut that charge. Fifth, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Street "forcibly" assaulted the rangers, even without physical contact. The court held that "force" under § 111 can be satisfied by a threat or display of physical aggression that inspires reasonable fear of pain, bodily harm, or death. Street's agitated behavior, obscenities, fist-swinging, trapping Coe, lunging at him, and thrusting his fist and finger at Bisehoff, coupled with directing his son to fight, reasonably inspired fear in the officers. Sixth, the rangers were "engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties" when Street assaulted them. Although not authorized to enforce state game laws or make arrests, their duties included assisting other law enforcement officials and checking identification as part of cooperative agreements and deer patrol. They were assisting a state agent's investigation, which falls within the broad interpretation of official duties intended to protect federal officers and functions. Seventh, the district court correctly applied U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 (Aggravated Assault) for sentencing via the cross-reference in § 2A2.4. Under the amended guidelines, the court could consider "underlying conduct" or "relevant conduct" under § 1B1.3(a)(1). Street's confrontation with Agent Ford, which was temporally and geographically intertwined with the ranger incident and involved common victims and intent (threatening to have his son shoot Ford with a dangerous weapon), justified the aggravated assault classification. Finally, considering Street's conduct toward Agent Ford for sentencing, despite its prior prosecution by the state, did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Citing Witte v. United States, the court explained that using relevant conduct to enhance a sentence within the statutory range for the offense of conviction is not considered "punishment" for the relevant conduct itself for double jeopardy purposes.