United States v. Weston
2009 WL 1650456, 67 M.J. 390, 2009 CAAF LEXIS 642 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
The consent of one co-occupant who possesses common authority over a premises is valid against an absent, objecting co-occupant. For an objection to invalidate a co-occupant's consent, the objecting party must be physically present at the scene and make an immediate challenge to the search.
Facts:
- Staff Sergeant (SSgt) ME, a Marine, shared a work bathroom with Appellant, Staff Sergeant Weston.
- After feeling for a year that she was being watched, SSgt ME noticed an odd electric razor in the shared bathroom.
- SSgt ME took the razor and had it opened, discovering a hidden camera inside.
- She reported the discovery to the Provost Marshal’s Office (PMO) and to Weston's wife, Mrs. Weston.
- That evening, military police met Weston and his wife at their home and escorted them to the PMO, where they were placed in separate rooms.
- An investigator asked Weston for consent to search his home, and Weston unequivocally objected.
- The same investigator then asked Mrs. Weston for consent to search the home; she consented, unaware that her husband had refused.
- During the subsequent search of the home, investigators seized Weston's computer, which was later found to contain nonconsensual images of SSgt ME.
Procedural Posture:
- Weston was charged in a general court-martial.
- The defense filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from Weston's home, which the military judge denied.
- A panel of members at the court-martial found Weston guilty of housebreaking and two specifications of invasion of privacy.
- Weston, as appellant, appealed to the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals.
- A panel of the appellate court reversed the trial court, holding the search was unconstitutional.
- The Government, as appellee, successfully moved for a rehearing en banc.
- The en banc Court of Criminal Appeals reversed its panel's decision and affirmed the military judge's ruling.
- The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted review of the case.
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Issue:
Does the consent of one co-occupant to a search of a shared residence render the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when another co-occupant has previously objected to the search but is not physically present at the residence to challenge the entry?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Stucky
Yes, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. Randolph, which allows a physically present co-tenant's objection to override another's consent, creates a narrow exception to the general rule established in United States v. Matlock. The Matlock rule holds that consent from one person with common authority is valid against an absent, non-consenting person. The court in Randolph drew a 'fine line' requiring both physical presence and an immediate objection at the threshold for the exception to apply. Because Weston objected while at the PMO and was not physically present at his home to challenge the search, his objection did not invalidate his wife's valid consent. Furthermore, there was no evidence that police removed Weston from the home for the purpose of avoiding his objection.
Concurring - Chief Judge Effron
This opinion does not answer the issue directly, instead arguing that the case should be resolved on the alternative grounds of inevitable discovery. Assuming for the sake of argument that the search was unlawful, the evidence seized would have been inevitably discovered through lawful means. Law enforcement officials had sufficient information—including the camera-equipped razor identified as Weston's, his computer expertise, and his wife's statements—to establish probable cause for a search authorization. Routine police procedures would have led to a warrant and the discovery of the evidence on the computer, making it admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
Concurring - Judge Erdmann
No, the search was not reasonable and violated Weston's Fourth Amendment rights; however, the evidence is admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The majority misapplies Georgia v. Randolph. This case falls within the Randolph exception for situations where police remove a potentially objecting tenant to avoid an objection. By detaining Weston at the PMO, taking his phone, and securing his wife's consent without informing her of his objection, the police effectively prevented him from being physically present to object. Despite the constitutional violation, the conviction should be affirmed because, as Chief Judge Effron explains, the evidence would have been inevitably discovered pursuant to a valid search warrant.
Analysis:
This decision strictly interprets the 'physical presence' requirement from Georgia v. Randolph, solidifying it as a bright-line rule within the military justice system. It reinforces the broad authority of a consenting co-tenant when an objecting tenant is absent from the premises, even if that absence is due to police detention. The case highlights a significant circuit split on the scope of Randolph, with this court choosing a narrow interpretation over the more expansive view adopted by courts like the Ninth Circuit. The concurrences demonstrate that even where a Fourth Amendment violation is found, the inevitable discovery doctrine can serve as a powerful tool for the prosecution to save crucial evidence from suppression.
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