United States v. Watts
519 U.S. 148 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A sentencing court may consider conduct underlying a charge of which a defendant has been acquitted, so long as that conduct is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. An acquittal on criminal charges does not preclude the government from relitigating the issue at sentencing under this lower standard of proof.
Facts:
- In the case of Vernon Lee Watts, police discovered cocaine base in his kitchen and two loaded guns with ammunition hidden in a bedroom closet.
- A jury convicted Watts of possessing the cocaine base but acquitted him of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense.
- In the case of Cheryl Putra, authorities videotaped two cocaine transactions in which she and a codefendant sold cocaine to a government informant.
- The first transaction on May 8, 1992, involved one ounce of cocaine, while the second transaction on May 9, 1992, involved five ounces.
- A jury convicted Putra of aiding and abetting the first transaction but acquitted her of the second.
Procedural Posture:
- In federal district court, a jury convicted Vernon Lee Watts of possessing cocaine base but acquitted him of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense.
- At Watts' sentencing, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that he possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense and increased his sentence accordingly.
- In a separate case in federal district court, a jury convicted Cheryl Putra of one count of aiding and abetting a cocaine sale but acquitted her of a second, larger sale that occurred the next day.
- At Putra's sentencing, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that she participated in the second sale and aggregated the drug quantities from both days to increase her sentence.
- Both Watts and Putra appealed their sentences to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit vacated both sentences, establishing a rule that a sentencing judge may not rely on facts underlying a charge for which the defendant was acquitted.
- The United States petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review both Ninth Circuit decisions.
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Issue:
Does a jury's verdict of acquittal on a criminal charge prevent a sentencing court from considering the conduct underlying that charge when sentencing the defendant for a separate, convicted offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent a sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. An acquittal merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt; it is not a finding of innocence or a rejection of the underlying facts. The court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and the Sentencing Guidelines grant courts broad discretion to consider all information regarding a defendant's conduct. Citing Witte v. United States, the court explained that this does not constitute punishment for the acquitted crime in violation of double jeopardy, but rather is an enhancement of the sentence for the crime of conviction based on the manner in which it was committed. Since the standard of proof at sentencing (preponderance of the evidence) is lower than at trial (beyond a reasonable doubt), a sentencing court can find a fact to be true even if a jury had a reasonable doubt.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. A sentencing court should be prevented from considering conduct for which a defendant was acquitted when calculating the mandatory sentencing guideline range. The dissent argues that the majority misapplies 18 U.S.C. § 3661, contending it applies only to a judge's discretion within a guideline range, not to the factual findings that determine the range itself. Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 994(l) directs the Sentencing Commission to provide incremental punishment for a defendant 'convicted of' multiple offenses, which implies Congress did not intend such punishment for acquitted offenses. To allow a charge that could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to produce the same punishment as one that was is 'repugnant' to traditional jurisprudence.
Dissenting - Justice Kennedy
The dissent does not directly answer the issue but argues the case should not have been decided by summary reversal. The issue of using acquitted conduct at sentencing is of recurrent importance and raises serious concerns about undercutting a jury's verdict. The distinction between uncharged conduct and conduct for which a defendant was acquitted is significant and ought to have been confronted with full briefing and oral argument, not dismissed lightly.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No. Justice Scalia agrees with the majority but writes to challenge Justice Breyer's concurrence. He argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3661 is a binding statutory command that '[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information' a court can consider. Therefore, neither the courts nor the Sentencing Commission has the authority to create a rule that mandates disregarding information about acquitted conduct at sentencing.
Concurring - Justice Breyer
No. Justice Breyer joins the majority's opinion but emphasizes that the decision interprets the Sentencing Guidelines as they are currently written. He notes that the Sentencing Commission has the policy-making authority to revisit this issue and could amend the Guidelines in the future to create a specific exception that would prevent judges from enhancing sentences based on acquitted conduct. Today's ruling poses no obstacle to the Commission making such a change.
Analysis:
This decision solidified the broad discretion of sentencing judges under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and resolved a circuit split on the issue. It firmly established that the different standards of proof at trial ('beyond a reasonable doubt') and sentencing ('preponderance of the evidence') allow for what might seem like contradictory outcomes. The ruling confirms that an acquittal is not a shield; prosecutors can essentially get a 'second bite at the apple' at sentencing, potentially leading to significantly longer sentences based on conduct a jury did not find to be proven to the criminal standard.
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