United States v. Washington
431 U.S. 181 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination does not require prosecutors to advise a grand jury witness that they are a potential defendant or a target of the investigation before their testimony can be used against them in a subsequent prosecution.
Facts:
- A police officer stopped a van owned by respondent Washington but driven by his friends, Zimmerman and Woodard.
- The officer discovered a stolen motorcycle in the back of the van and arrested both men.
- When Washington came to reclaim his van, he told police a story about helping an unknown motorcyclist whose machine had broken down by allowing the motorcycle to be placed in his van.
- Washington claimed he then left the van with the stranger to call his friends for help, and when he returned, the van was gone.
- A police officer told Washington he did not believe the story and warned him that he would be in trouble if he repeated it in court.
- An Assistant United States Attorney also expressed skepticism about the story before subpoenaing Washington to appear before a grand jury investigating the theft.
Procedural Posture:
- Respondent Washington was indicted by a grand jury for grand larceny and receiving stolen property.
- Washington filed a motion in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia (trial court) to suppress his grand jury testimony and quash the indictment.
- The Superior Court suppressed the testimony and dismissed the indictment, finding Washington had not effectively waived his Fifth Amendment rights.
- The Government appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order suppressing the testimony but held the indictment should not have been dismissed.
- The United States then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination require suppression of a grand jury witness's testimony at a subsequent trial against him when the prosecutor failed to inform the witness, before testifying, that he was a potential defendant?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Burger
No. The Fifth Amendment does not require suppression of the testimony because a prosecutor is not constitutionally required to inform a grand jury witness of their potential defendant status. The Fifth Amendment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a genuine compulsion of testimony. The grand jury setting is not inherently coercive like custodial interrogation, and therefore the full scope of Miranda warnings, including potential defendant status, is not required. Here, Washington received comprehensive warnings that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him, and that he had a right to a lawyer. These warnings were sufficient to eliminate any possible compulsion and to alert him to his right to refuse to answer incriminating questions. Furthermore, the surrounding circumstances—including the disbelief expressed by both the police officer and the prosecutor—put Washington on notice that he was a suspect.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The privilege against self-incrimination is emptied of substance unless a witness whom the prosecutor intends to indict is advised that they are a potential defendant. In circumstances where a grand jury inquiry becomes an investigation directed against the witness, standard warnings about the right to silence are insufficient. Without a specific warning about their target status followed by an intentional and intelligent waiver, the witness cannot be truly free from compulsory self-incrimination, and any testimony obtained should be unavailable to the government for use at trial. Failure to provide such a warning is a gross encroachment upon the witness’s privilege and represents the kind of high-handed inquisitorial practice the Fifth Amendment was designed to prevent.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the Fifth Amendment's protections in a grand jury setting are not coextensive with those in a custodial interrogation context as defined in Miranda v. Arizona. By rejecting the need for 'target' or 'potential defendant' warnings, the Court places a greater burden on grand jury witnesses to recognize their own potential criminal exposure and affirmatively invoke their right to remain silent. The ruling reinforces that the core of the Fifth Amendment privilege is protection against compulsion, not protection from making strategic errors or incriminating oneself voluntarily after being advised of basic rights. This gives prosecutors more latitude in questioning potential defendants before a grand jury without jeopardizing the admissibility of their testimony.
