United States v. Walter David Tallmadge
829 F.2d 767, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12989 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause prohibits a defendant's conviction for a strict liability offense when the defendant reasonably relied on an affirmative representation by a government agent that the proscribed conduct was lawful. Federally licensed firearms dealers are considered government agents for the purpose of this defense, known as entrapment by estoppel.
Facts:
- In 1978, Walter David Tallmadge was convicted in a California state court of illegal possession of a machine gun, a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.
- In 1979, the state court stayed imposition of sentence and placed Tallmadge on probation for three years, with a condition that he not own or possess any dangerous or deadly weapons.
- On January 26, 1982, after Tallmadge successfully completed his probation, the state court reduced his felony conviction to a misdemeanor 'for all purposes.'
- At the 1982 hearing, the state prosecutor and judge informed Tallmadge that the order did not permit him to own a concealable firearm under California law, but made no mention of non-concealable firearms or federal law.
- Following the hearing, Tallmadge's attorney advised him that he could legally possess 'long guns' (non-concealable firearms).
- In 1982, before purchasing any firearms, Tallmadge discussed his prior conviction with Lewis Ferguson, the president of Cole’s Manchester Arms, a federally licensed firearms dealer.
- Tallmadge informed Ferguson that his felony conviction had been reduced to a misdemeanor, and Ferguson agreed that there was 'no problem' with Tallmadge purchasing a firearm.
- On four separate occasions in 1982, Tallmadge purchased rifles from Cole's, each time answering 'no' to the question on the federal form asking if he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
Procedural Posture:
- Walter David Tallmadge was indicted in the United States District Court on multiple counts, including receiving and possessing a firearm after a felony conviction.
- The case was tried in a bench trial before the district court judge, based largely on stipulated facts.
- The district court found Tallmadge not guilty of the counts requiring specific intent (making false statements) but found him guilty of the counts of receiving and possessing a firearm.
- Tallmadge, as appellant, appealed his convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause prevent the conviction of a defendant for violating federal firearms statutes when he reasonably relied on the advice of a federally licensed firearms dealer who stated that his conduct was lawful?
Opinions:
Majority - Alarcon, Circuit Judge
Yes. A defendant's conviction violates the Due Process Clause under the doctrine of entrapment by estoppel when he reasonably relies on an official's statement that certain conduct is legal. Citing Supreme Court precedent in Raley v. Ohio and Cox v. Louisiana, the court held that this defense applies when a government official affirmatively misleads a person into violating the law. The court concluded that federally licensed firearms dealers act as federal agents because Congress and the Treasury Department have given them an affirmative duty to enforce federal gun laws by questioning buyers and providing information on legal restrictions. Tallmadge's reliance on the dealer's statement was reasonable, as it was supported by advice from his own attorney and the state court's specific warning only mentioned concealable weapons. Therefore, prosecuting Tallmadge after he was misled by a government agent into believing his actions were lawful is an 'indefensible sort of entrapment by the State' that violates due process.
Dissenting - Kozinski, Circuit Judge
No. The conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause. The majority's application of entrapment by estoppel is misguided for several reasons. First, a private gun dealer is not a government official authorized to bind the government with an erroneous interpretation of the law. Second, Tallmadge's reliance on the dealer's off-the-cuff advice was not reasonable, as the dealer had a financial incentive to make the sale. Third, the federal statutes at issue are strict liability offenses that do not require scienter (knowledge of wrongdoing), meaning Tallmadge’s subjective belief about the legality of his actions is irrelevant. Allowing this defense effectively reads a mental state requirement into a strict liability crime and creates a dangerous precedent where government licensees can grant immunity from federal law.
Analysis:
This decision formally establishes the 'entrapment by estoppel' defense in the Ninth Circuit, creating a significant due process exception to strict liability criminal statutes. The ruling's primary impact is its expansion of who qualifies as a 'government agent' to include federal licensees, such as firearms dealers, who are tasked with certain enforcement and informational duties. This precedent complicates prosecutions under federal firearms laws and other regulatory schemes by allowing defendants to argue they were misled by private parties acting with government authority. The case highlights the tension between strict enforcement of public safety regulations and the due process right not to be punished for conduct that a government agent has represented as lawful.
