United States v. Wade
20 ERC 1277, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20096 (1983)
Rule of Law:
Under CERCLA, generator liability for hazardous waste cleanup costs does not require the government to 'fingerprint' a specific defendant's waste at a site but rather that hazardous substances of the 'sort' generated are present and released; furthermore, Section 107 liability is independent of Superfund expenditure limitations under Section 104, and joint and several liability is applicable under federal common law unless defendants establish a reasonable basis for apportionment.
Facts:
- Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980 to address the national problem of toxic waste and establish a 'Superfund' for clean-up operations.
- The United States identified a hazardous waste dump site in Chester, Pennsylvania, known as the Wade site.
- Melvin R. Wade owned the Wade dump site.
- ABM Disposal Service, owned by Ellis Barnhouse and Franklin P. Tyson during the relevant period, transported hazardous substances to the Wade site.
- Apollo Metals, Inc., Congoleum Corporation, Gould, Inc., and Sandvik, Inc. generated hazardous substances that were allegedly disposed of at the Wade site.
- Hazardous substances present at the Wade site have leached or are actively leaching into the soil and groundwater.
- The federal government spent approximately $689,000 in initial clean-up efforts at the Wade site.
- Generators other than the named defendants paid approximately $1.9 million in settlement of claims related to the Wade site clean-up.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States initiated a civil action in the District Court against Melvin R. Wade (site owner), ABM Disposal Service and its owners Ellis Barnhouse and Franklin P. Tyson (transporter/owners), and Apollo Metals, Inc., Congoleum Corporation, Gould, Inc., and Sandvik, Inc. (generator defendants).
- The government sought injunctive relief under RCRA § 7003 and CERCLA § 106, and monetary relief based on CERCLA § 107(a) and a common law theory of restitution.
- The government filed motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of joint and several liability under § 107(a) against each of the defendants.
- Each of the generator defendants moved for summary judgment.
- The District Court had previously dismissed the plaintiff's § 7003 claim based on a federal common law theory of restitution against the generator defendants in an earlier ruling (United States v. Wade, 546 F.Supp. 785 (E.D.Pa.1982)).
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Issue:
Does the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) require the government to prove a direct causal link between a specific generator's waste and the incurred clean-up costs, limit recoverable costs to those already incurred or authorized by Superfund restrictions, or prohibit the imposition of joint and several liability for multiple responsible parties?
Opinions:
Majority - Newcomer, District Judge
No, CERCLA does not require the government to prove a direct causal link between a specific generator's waste and the incurred clean-up costs, nor does it limit recoverable costs to those already incurred or authorized by Superfund restrictions, nor does it prohibit the imposition of joint and several liability. The court rejected the 'fingerprinting' requirement, reasoning that requiring a plaintiff to prove that a specific defendant's actual waste is presently at the site and subject to removal measures would 'eviscerate the statute' given the limitations of scientific technique. Instead, liability under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) requires proof that a defendant: (1) disposed of its hazardous substances; (2) at a facility which now contains hazardous substances of the 'sort' disposed of by the generator; and (3) a release of 'a' hazardous substance (not necessarily the defendant's specific waste) causes the incurrence of response costs. This interpretation is supported by the deletion of more stringent causation language from earlier drafts of CERCLA, reflecting legislative intent to facilitate prompt cleanup and place the financial burden on responsible parties. The court also held that liability under § 107 for 'all costs of removal or remedial action' is not restricted by limitations on Superfund expenditures under § 104. Section 104 serves to protect the limited Superfund, while § 107's purpose is to recover costs from responsible parties, thereby replenishing the Fund. Furthermore, the court determined that Congress intended for federal common law principles to govern the scope of liability under CERCLA, rather than state law, due to the strong federal interest in abating toxic waste sites and the need for a uniform liability standard. Adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 433A and 433B, the court ruled that joint and several liability should be imposed unless defendants can establish a reasonable basis for apportioning the harm among them, with the burden of proof for apportionment resting on the defendants. Finally, the court clarified that to establish a defendant’s wastes as hazardous, the government must prove the waste contains an unspecified quantity of substances designated as hazardous or toxic under the statutes specified in CERCLA’s definition, without necessarily meeting specific 'reportable quantity' or 'effluent standards'.
Analysis:
This case provided critical early judicial interpretation of CERCLA, significantly broadening the scope of liability for hazardous waste generators. By rejecting the stringent 'fingerprinting' requirement, the court removed a major evidentiary hurdle for the government, making it much easier to hold responsible parties accountable at multi-party contaminated sites. The adoption of federal common law for joint and several liability, with the burden on defendants to prove divisibility of harm, became a cornerstone of CERCLA enforcement, enabling the government to recover costs efficiently. This decision solidified CERCLA's intent to prioritize prompt environmental remediation and shift the financial burden from taxpayers to polluters, despite the complexities of proving direct causation for commingled wastes.
