United States v. Urena
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20720, 2011 WL 4840665, 659 F.3d 903 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A claim of self-defense requires evidence of an immediate threat of unlawful force and a proportionate response, and insulting words, even in a prison environment, do not justify a pre-emptive attack with deadly force; additionally, a physician's opinion on the causation of injuries constitutes expert testimony, and a district court has broad discretion to refuse a belated expert witness designation.
Facts:
- On the morning of April 11, 2006, federal prisoner Gary Dennis grabbed fellow inmate Lenny Urena and called him a “bitch.”
- Urena returned the insult, and the two inmates separated.
- Hours later, Urena attacked Dennis by surprise, striking him in the face.
- Dennis attempted to disengage, but Urena pursued him and struck him repeatedly from behind.
- Dennis eventually grabbed Urena and wrestled him to the ground.
- Another inmate, Nekis Atwater, intervened by kicking Dennis in the back of the head and punching him at least fourteen times.
- Dennis sustained superficial lacerations that required stitches, but his treating physician, Dr. David, reported that an injury above his right eye was likely caused by a punch or fall, not a knife.
- A prison-made knife ("shank") was recovered from underneath Urena’s shoulder, and Urena confessed that the shank was his and that he held it during the fight, though he later claimed this was to protect Atwater.
Procedural Posture:
- Lenny Urena was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of contraband in prison in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
- At trial, the district court initially allowed Urena to argue self-defense in his opening statement.
- The district court later refused to instruct the jury on self-defense, reasoning that Urena had not established a sufficient factual foundation.
- The Government moved to preclude Urena from questioning the treating physician, Dr. David, about the causation of injuries during cross-examination, and the district court granted the motion.
- During the trial, Urena attempted to designate Dr. David as his expert witness on causation, but the district court rejected this attempt.
- A jury convicted Lenny Urena of assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of contraband in prison.
- The district court sentenced Urena to 60 months, applying the then-current sentencing guidelines which included "recency points" (resulting in a range of 77-96 months).
- Lenny Urena appealed his jury conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Appellant Urena, Appellee United States).
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Issue:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing a self-defense jury instruction based on an inmate's pre-emptive attack following an insult, by limiting cross-examination of a treating physician on injury causation as expert testimony, and by refusing a belated expert designation, or was the defendant's sentence substantively unreasonable due to a subsequent, non-retroactive guidelines amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Gould, Circuit Judge
No, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the self-defense instruction, limiting cross-examination on causation, or denying belated expert designation, and Urena's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. To establish a prima-facie case for self-defense, a defendant must provide evidence of (1) a reasonable belief in the immediate necessity of force to defend against unlawful force, and (2) the use of no more force than reasonably necessary. The court affirmed that insulting words, even in a harsh prison environment, do not create an immediate threat of unlawful force sufficient to justify a surprise, pre-emptive attack with deadly force, nor does a general claim that the victim might have had a weapon. Even if Dennis possessed a knife, the evidence was undisputed that Urena initiated the attack, thus precluding a self-defense theory. Regarding the evidentiary claims, the court held that limiting cross-examination to the scope of direct examination under Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b) does not violate the Confrontation Clause unless it limits relevant testimony, prejudices the defendant, and denies the jury sufficient information to appraise the witness's biases. Here, Dr. David, the treating physician, testified only on the nature and extent of Dennis's injuries, and Urena was allowed to cross-examine on those issues. A physician's assessment of the cause of an injury constitutes expert testimony, unlike a mere description of its nature, as it involves specialized judgment beyond a lay juror. The district court was within its broad discretion to refuse Urena's belated attempt to designate Dr. David as an expert witness once the trial had begun, particularly when no medical expert was designated during the pretrial conference. Finally, the court concluded that Urena's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. It reiterated that subsequent, non-retroactive amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, such as Amendment 742 eliminating "recency points," do not retroactively render a previously calculated and properly imposed sentence unreasonable. Courts are required to apply the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, and only clarifying or designated retroactive amendments can have retroactive effect. The court explicitly declined to adopt the First Circuit's approach in United States v. Godin, which allowed resentencing based on non-retroactive changes.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the strict parameters of self-defense claims, establishing that verbal provocation, even in high-stakes environments like prison, does not justify a pre-emptive attack with deadly force, and emphasizes the requirement of an immediate threat and proportionate response. It further delineates the distinction between lay and expert medical testimony, affirming that a physician's opinion on the causation of an injury requires expert designation. The ruling also reinforces the district court's broad discretion in managing trial proceedings, particularly concerning expert witness disclosure deadlines, and provides a clear precedent that non-retroactive changes to sentencing guidelines do not warrant resentencing or automatically render prior sentences unreasonable.
