United States v. United States Dist. Court
490 U.S. 296 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
The federal statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which states that a court "may request an attorney to represent" an indigent person, does not authorize a federal court to compel an unwilling attorney to accept such an appointment in a civil case.
Facts:
- The District Court for the Southern District of Iowa established a program to provide representation for indigent litigants pursuant to a directive from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
- The program operated by having the Volunteer Lawyers Project (VLP) select attorneys from a roster of all lawyers admitted to practice before the court.
- John E. Mallard was an attorney admitted to practice before the District Court.
- In June 1987, the VLP selected Mallard and asked him to represent three inmates in a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials.
- Mallard informed the court that he had no experience in litigation or § 1983 actions, as his expertise was in bankruptcy and securities law.
- Mallard also stated that he was not suited for litigation by temperament, disliked confrontation, and felt he could not competently handle the case.
Procedural Posture:
- Mallard filed a motion to withdraw from the court-ordered representation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
- A Magistrate denied Mallard's motion.
- Mallard appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the Magistrate's decision, holding that § 1915(d) authorizes compulsory appointments.
- Mallard sought a writ of mandamus from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, asking it to order the District Court to permit his withdrawal.
- The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Mallard's petition without an opinion.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the issue.
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Issue:
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorize a federal court to require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
No. The statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) does not authorize federal courts to make coercive appointments of counsel. The Court's reasoning is based on statutory interpretation, focusing on the plain meaning of the word 'request,' which is precatory, not mandatory. To 'request' is to ask or petition, not to command or require. This interpretation is reinforced by contrasting § 1915(d) with § 1915(c), enacted at the same time, which uses the mandatory term 'shall' when referring to the duties of court officers. Furthermore, when Congress has intended to authorize compulsory service in other statutes, it has used stronger language like 'assign' or 'appoint,' demonstrating that its choice of 'request' in § 1915(d) was deliberate and intended to permit attorneys to decline representation.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. A court's formal request to an attorney under a structured appointment program is tantamount to a command that should be obeyed absent good reason. The dissent argues that the majority's focus on the plain meaning of 'request' is too narrow and ignores the broader context of a lawyer's professional obligations as an officer of the court. The duty to serve the indigent is a long-standing tradition of the legal profession. The legislative history of § 1915(d), including its title referring to when counsel 'shall be assigned,' indicates Congress intended to empower courts consistent with state practices that did involve compulsory appointments. For an attorney who has voluntarily joined a court's bar, a 'request' made pursuant to that court's established procedures for indigent representation should be treated as a mandatory professional obligation.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
No. The statute does not authorize compulsory appointments. While joining the majority's statutory interpretation in full, this opinion emphasizes the distinction between legal requirements and professional responsibility. The Court's decision is limited to the legal power conferred by the statute and does not diminish the profound ethical obligation lawyers have to perform pro bono service. Accepting a court's request to represent the indigent is a traditional and noble professional duty, even if it cannot be legally compelled under § 1915(d).
Analysis:
This decision narrowly interprets a key federal statute for indigent civil representation, clarifying that courts lack statutory power under § 1915(d) to compel attorneys to serve. By distinguishing between a precatory 'request' and a mandatory 'assignment,' the Court places greater emphasis on the voluntary and ethical dimensions of pro bono service. However, the ruling explicitly leaves open the significant question of whether federal courts possess 'inherent authority' to make such compulsory appointments, ensuring future litigation on the issue. This creates a potential gap in representation for indigent civil litigants, as courts must rely on attorneys' willingness to volunteer rather than their power to conscript.
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