United States v. Ulbricht
858 F.3d 71, 2017 WL 2346566 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
Under the third-party disclosure doctrine, an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in non-content Internet Protocol (IP) address routing information that is voluntarily conveyed to a third-party internet service provider, and therefore, the government's warrantless collection of such data using a pen/trap order does not constitute a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Facts:
- Ross William Ulbricht created and operated an anonymous online criminal marketplace called Silk Road under the username 'Dread Pirate Roberts' (DPR).
- Silk Road operated on the Tor Network and used Bitcoin for transactions, facilitating the sale of approximately $183 million worth of illegal drugs, fraudulent identification documents, and computer hacking software.
- Ulbricht, as DPR, earned millions of dollars in commissions from the illicit transactions conducted on the site.
- To protect the site's anonymity, Ulbricht commissioned the murders of five individuals he believed were threats, paying a total of $650,000 in Bitcoin for the hits to be carried out.
- In September 2013, as part of their investigation, government agents obtained five pen/trap orders to collect IP address routing data for internet traffic to and from Ulbricht’s home wireless router and associated devices.
- Two federal agents involved in the investigation, Carl Force and Shaun Bridges, engaged in corrupt conduct, including stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars in Bitcoin from the site and attempting to extort Ulbricht.
- Ulbricht was arrested in a San Francisco public library while actively logged into the Silk Road administrative interface on his laptop under the DPR username.
Procedural Posture:
- Ross Ulbricht was charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- Prior to trial, Ulbricht moved to suppress evidence obtained from pen/trap orders and various search warrants, arguing the collection and searches violated the Fourth Amendment.
- The district court denied Ulbricht's motion to suppress.
- After a three-week trial, a jury found Ulbricht guilty on all seven counts.
- The district court sentenced Ulbricht to life in prison.
- Ulbricht filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied.
- Ulbricht (appellant) appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with the United States (appellee) opposing.
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Issue:
Does the warrantless collection of a person's Internet Protocol (IP) address routing information by the government, using pen/trap orders, violate the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Lynch
No, the warrantless collection of IP address routing information does not violate the Fourth Amendment. A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties. Applying the third-party disclosure doctrine established in Smith v. Maryland, the court held that collecting non-content IP address data is constitutionally indistinguishable from using a pen register to capture dialed telephone numbers. Internet users voluntarily convey IP addresses to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to route their communications, thereby relinquishing any reasonable expectation of privacy in that specific information. The court rejected the argument that monitoring this traffic constituted an impermissible search of the home under Kyllo v. United States, noting that, like a home telephone pen register, it only reveals data disclosed to an outside provider, not intimate details from within the home. Therefore, the government did not need a warrant based on probable cause to obtain the pen/trap orders.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of the pre-digital era third-party disclosure doctrine to modern internet communications metadata. The court's holding confirms that non-content routing information, such as IP addresses, lacks Fourth Amendment protection because it is shared with an intermediary (the ISP). This ruling provides law enforcement with a significant tool for tracking online activity without needing a warrant, reinforcing a distinction between protected content and unprotected metadata. The opinion acknowledges but ultimately feels bound by precedent, leaving for the Supreme Court the larger question of whether the third-party doctrine remains viable in an age where vast amounts of personal data are entrusted to third parties.
