United States v. Turner
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2207, 2010 WL 346219, 594 F.3d 946 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A court violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice by disqualifying a retained attorney based on a mere possibility of a conflict of interest; disqualification is only permissible when there is an actual conflict or a serious potential for conflict.
Facts:
- Roosevelt Turner and Anthony Womack were indicted as coconspirators in a cocaine distribution scheme.
- After two trials, a jury convicted Womack, and he was awaiting sentencing.
- Following his conviction, Womack retained attorney Irl Baris to represent him for sentencing and on appeal.
- Turner, who was arrested over a year after the initial indictment, also retained Baris as his defense attorney.
- At the time Baris was retained by Turner, neither Turner nor Womack had expressed any interest in cooperating with the government against the other.
- Both Turner and Womack consented to the joint representation and were prepared to waive any potential conflict of interest.
- The government had not indicated a specific intention to seek cooperation or testimony from either defendant against the other.
Procedural Posture:
- The government indicted Roosevelt Turner, Anthony Womack, and others for conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
- Womack was convicted by a jury in a federal district court.
- After Turner was arrested, the government filed a motion in the district court for a hearing to evaluate a potential conflict of interest arising from attorney Irl Baris representing both Turner and Womack.
- Following the hearing, the district court judge found an 'absolute' conflict and entered an order disqualifying Baris from representing Turner.
- Represented by new counsel, Turner was convicted at a jury trial and sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment.
- Turner, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, challenging the district court's disqualification of his chosen counsel.
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Issue:
Does a district court violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice by disqualifying their chosen attorney based on the mere possibility that one of two jointly represented codefendants might decide to cooperate with the government against the other, when both defendants have waived any conflict?
Opinions:
Majority - Sykes, Circuit Judge
Yes, the district court's disqualification order violated Turner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. There is a strong presumption in favor of a defendant’s chosen counsel, which can only be overcome by an actual conflict of interest or a 'serious potential for conflict.' The district court erred by disqualifying the attorney based on the mere possibility that one client might cooperate against the other, a potential conflict that 'inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation.' This approach amounted to an improper per se rule against joint representation, contrary to Supreme Court precedent in Wheat v. United States. The government failed to demonstrate that the potential conflict had a serious likelihood of maturing into an actual one, as neither defendant wished to cooperate and the government had not sought their assistance. Because the wrongful denial of counsel of choice is a structural error, Turner is entitled to a new trial.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high constitutional value placed on a defendant's right to select their own counsel, particularly when they are not relying on appointed counsel. It clarifies that trial courts cannot disqualify an attorney based on speculative or generic conflicts that are inherent in most joint representation scenarios. The ruling requires a more rigorous, fact-specific inquiry into the likelihood and severity of a potential conflict, placing the burden on the government to show a 'serious potential' for conflict before a defendant's choice can be overridden. This precedent serves to protect defendants from having their chosen counsel disqualified on flimsy grounds, thereby preserving a core component of the Sixth Amendment right.
