United States v. Trenkler
61 F.3d 45, 42 Fed. R. Serv. 380, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 17326 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a prior criminal act may be admitted under FRE 404(b) to prove the defendant's identity if the totality of the comparison between the prior act and the charged offense reveals a conjunction of characteristics sufficiently idiosyncratic to support an inference that the same person committed both.
Facts:
- In 1986, Alfred Trenkler constructed a remote-control, radio-activated explosive device for his friend, Donna Shea, to intimidate the owners of the Capeway Fish Market in Quincy, Massachusetts.
- The 'Quincy bomb' used a military flash simulator as its explosive, a radio receiver from a toy car, and was wrapped in duct tape with a donut-shaped magnet for attachment to a vehicle.
- Trenkler attempted to have Shea's nephew purchase electrical components from a Radio Shack for the Quincy bomb, but ultimately entered the store himself to assist.
- On October 27, 1991, Thomas L. Shay, Sr. heard a noise from under his car and later found a suspicious object in his driveway in Roslindale, Massachusetts.
- On October 28, 1991, the object exploded, killing one Boston police officer and severely injuring another who were dispatched to investigate.
- The 'Roslindale bomb' was a remote-control, radio-activated device using dynamite, housed in a wooden box, and attached to the car with a large donut-shaped magnet and several smaller magnets.
- The government contended Trenkler built the Roslindale bomb for his friend Thomas A. Shay, Jr. (Shay, Sr.'s son), who purchased a toggle switch identical to one used in the bomb from a Radio Shack near where Trenkler was working.
- While incarcerated together in December 1992, Trenkler allegedly admitted to a fellow inmate, David Lindholm, that he had built the Roslindale bomb.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted Alfred Trenkler and Thomas A. Shay Jr. for conspiracy and other charges related to the 1991 Roslindale bombing.
- Trenkler's motion to sever his trial from his co-defendant's was granted by the district court.
- The government filed a pretrial motion in limine seeking to admit evidence of Trenkler's involvement in a 1986 bombing in Quincy.
- The U.S. District Court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the government's motion, ruling the prior act evidence was admissible.
- A jury in the U.S. District Court found Trenkler guilty on all counts.
- Trenkler appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the admission of evidence of a defendant's prior similar act (a bombing) to prove identity violate Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) where there are both significant similarities and differences between the prior act and the charged crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Stahl, J.
No. The admission of the prior bombing evidence does not violate FRE 404(b) because the similarities between the two incidents are sufficiently idiosyncratic to be relevant to the issue of identity, and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. To admit Rule 404(b) evidence to prove identity, a court must find that the shared characteristics are sufficiently idiosyncratic that a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that the same person performed both acts. The analysis focuses on the 'totality of the comparison,' which can be satisfied by a 'conjunction of several identifying characteristics' even without a single highly distinctive quality. Here, the coalescence of similarities—including being remote-controlled, radio-activated, homemade, placed under vehicles, attached with magnets, built for a friend, and involving third-party component purchases—was persuasive enough to meet this standard. Although the court found that the admission of evidence from the EXIS computer database was an error under the residual hearsay exception (FRE 803(24)) due to a lack of trustworthiness in the underlying data, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of other overwhelming evidence of guilt, including Trenkler's jailhouse confession and his incriminating statements and drawings to law enforcement.
Dissenting - Torruella, C.J.
Yes. The admission of the EXIS database evidence was a constitutional error that was not harmless, and this error tainted the decision to admit the prior bombing evidence. The EXIS evidence, which suggested a unique link between the two bombings, was based on unreliable reports and violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. This error was not harmless because the standard for constitutional error requires the government to show it was 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,' meaning the other evidence of guilt must be 'overwhelming.' The dissent argues the district court explicitly relied on the flawed EXIS evidence to find the two bombs were similar enough to admit the Quincy evidence under Rule 404(b). Furthermore, the dissent contends the other evidence was not overwhelming; it consisted of ambiguous statements and the testimony of a jailhouse informant with serious credibility problems. The 'scientific' nature of the EXIS evidence was highly prejudicial and likely swayed the jury, meaning Trenkler did not receive a fair trial.
Analysis:
This case provides a significant application of the FRE 404(b) 'identity' exception, establishing that a 'signature' can be proven not by a single unique feature but by the 'totality of the comparison' of numerous shared, if individually common, characteristics. It reinforces the `Huddleston` standard that admissibility of such evidence is a question of conditional relevancy under FRE 104(b), requiring only enough evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude the connection exists. The opinion also serves as a strong cautionary precedent regarding the admission of law enforcement database evidence under the residual hearsay exception, emphasizing that the reliability of the underlying, unverified source data is paramount. The sharp dissent on the harmless error analysis illustrates the critical difference between 'substantial' and 'overwhelming' evidence when assessing the impact of a constitutional error on a jury's verdict.
