No, companies can't make deals to fix prices. The law says 'every' deal that stops competition is illegal. It doesn't say 'every unfair deal'—it says 'every' deal. When these railroads agreed to all charge the same price, they stopped competing with each other. That's against the law, period. It doesn't matter if they thought the prices were fair or if they meant well. The deal itself is what breaks the law.

Yes, this kind of deal should be allowed. For hundreds of years, the law only stopped deals that were unfair and hurt people. The majority is reading the word 'every' too strictly. These railroads weren't trying to hurt anyone—they were trying to avoid a price war that could destroy their businesses. The law shouldn't make normal, sensible business deals illegal. The majority's decision turns a good law into a bad one by making it too harsh.

Yes, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act bans all agreements that reduce competition in business dealings between states or countries, even if the agreement seems reasonable. The law doesn't make exceptions for reasonable limits on competition. Even though the railroad companies argue the law should only ban unreasonable limits, the court can't add an exception that Congress left out. The history of how the law was made also doesn't clearly show Congress meant to allow reasonable limits. So the agreement breaks the law, even if it tried to keep prices reasonable.

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act should not be interpreted to ban all agreements that affect competition, only those that unreasonably harm competition. Historically, many agreements that limited competition to some degree were still considered okay if the limit was reasonable. The law's ban on 'every agreement restraining trade' should be understood based on this historical context. Banning every single agreement that affects competition, even reasonable ones, would cancel many normal and helpful business deals. The law was meant to stop unreasonable harms to competition, not all impacts on it.

For prior discussions in this Court of the dominant concern of Congress to protect consumers from business combinations

The law is its own measure of right and wrong, of what it permits or forbids, and the judgment of the courts cannot be set up against it in a supposed accommodation of its policy with the good intention of parties, and, it may be, of some good results.

—the plain and ordinary meaning of...[section 1] is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is an unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included... "within the section's proscription

The Congress of 1890 also knew that railroads were subject to regulation not only by states but by the federal government itself, but this fact has been held insufficient to bring to the railroad companies the interpretative exemption from the Sherman Act they have sought.

The public policy of the government is to be found in its statutes, and when they have not directly spoken, then in the decisions of the courts and the constant practice of the government officials; but when the lawmaking power speaks upon a particular subject, over which it has constitutional power to legislate, public policy in such a

It is true that it has been held by this court that the act (anti-trust act) included any restraint of commerce, whether reasonable or unreasonable

As for Representative Tiffany's statement during a floor debate, courts have long recognized that "debates in [the legislature] are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body."

Trade or commerce under those circumstances may nevertheless be badly and unfortunately restrained by driving out of business the small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein, and who might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered surroundings.

Courts appropriately guard their ability to ascertain the actual facts at issue, rather than allow a party to thwart judicial review through its own machinations.

—rate agreement among railroads, approved by Interstate Commerce Commission, held subject to antitrust laws

Yes, the agreement violates the Sherman Antitrust Act. The plain language of the Act declares 'every contract' in restraint of trade to be illegal, which includes all such contracts and does not permit an exception for those that might be deemed 'reasonable.' The statute applies to common carriers by railroad, as their business is a form of interstate commerce. When Congress used the term 'contract in restraint of trade,' it included all contracts of that nature, not just those that were invalid at common law for being unreasonable. The court cannot read a 'reasonableness' standard into the statute where Congress omitted it, as doing so would be an act of judicial legislation. The necessary effect of the price-fixing agreement is to restrain competition and trade, regardless of the parties' intent or the reasonableness of the rates themselves.

No, the agreement does not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Act should be interpreted in light of the common law, where the term 'contract in restraint of trade' referred only to contracts that unreasonably restrained trade. To hold that the Act prohibits reasonable and necessary business contracts is to conclude that Congress enacted an unreasonable law that departs from established legal principles. The purpose of this agreement was not to harm the public but to prevent ruinous competition that would lead to instability and poor service. Furthermore, railroads are already subject to specific regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act, which implicitly permits such reasonable arrangements necessary to ensure stable and non-discriminatory rates.

Yes, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act prohibits all contracts in restraint of interstate or foreign trade or commerce, regardless of whether the restraint imposed is reasonable. The plain language of the act does not make any exceptions for reasonable restraints of trade. Although the defendants argue that the act should be read to prohibit only unreasonable restraints, the court cannot read into the act an exception that Congress did not include. The legislative history also does not clearly indicate an intent to limit the act's scope to only unreasonable restraints. Therefore, the agreement between the railroad companies violates the act, even if it aimed to maintain reasonable rates.

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act should not be interpreted to prohibit all contracts in restraint of trade, but only those that unreasonably restrain trade. At common law, many contracts that restrained trade to some degree were still considered valid and enforceable if the restraint was reasonable. The act's prohibition on 'every contract in restraint of trade' should be read in light of this well-established meaning. Prohibiting all contracts that restrain trade to any degree, even if reasonable, would invalidate many ordinary and beneficial business arrangements. The act's purpose was to prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade, not all contracts affecting competition.

United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn.

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