United States v. Torres
128 F.3d 38 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court has the discretion to excuse a prospective juror for cause based on a finding of "inferable bias" when facts disclosed during voir dire reveal a close similarity between the juror's past activities and the conduct charged against the defendant, without needing to specifically ask if the juror can be impartial.
Facts:
- Joaquin Rivera, an attorney, and Joseph T. Devery, a bank manager, were part of a conspiracy to launder proceeds from a heroin trafficking scheme.
- Devery opened bank accounts and facilitated large cash deposits for the scheme.
- As part of the conspiracy, Devery engaged in "structuring," which involved dividing large cash deposits into amounts less than $10,000 to avoid federal requirements for filing Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs).
- During jury selection for their trial, a prospective juror, identified as Juror No. 7, disclosed her past work experience.
- Juror No. 7 stated that while working in a payroll department years earlier, she had also engaged in structuring.
- Specifically, for two to three weeks, she had made multiple cash withdrawals, each under $10,000, to avoid triggering the bank's reporting requirements for the company's payroll.
Procedural Posture:
- Joaquin Rivera and Joseph T. Devery were prosecuted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- During jury selection (voir dire), the prosecution moved to excuse four prospective jurors for cause, including Juror No. 7.
- Over the defendants' objections, the trial judge granted the prosecution's motions to excuse the jurors.
- A jury convicted Rivera and Devery of conspiracy to launder money.
- The defendants filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, arguing that the jurors were improperly excused.
- The district court denied the defendants' motion for a new trial.
- Rivera and Devery, as appellants, appealed the denial of their motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by excusing a prospective juror for cause, without first asking if she could be impartial, when the juror reveals during voir dire that she has previously engaged in conduct closely similar to the criminal conduct for which the defendant is on trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Calabresi, Circuit Judge
No. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by excusing a prospective juror for cause based on 'inferable bias' where the juror's past conduct is closely akin to the defendant's alleged acts. The court created a new, third category of bias called 'inferable bias,' which exists between 'actual bias' (which requires a specific inquiry into impartiality) and 'implied bias' (which is mandatorily presumed in exceptional situations, like a familial relationship). Inferable bias grants a trial judge discretion to dismiss a juror when facts disclosed at voir dire reveal a situation that poses a significant risk of partiality, even if it doesn't meet the high bar for mandatory disqualification. In this case, Juror No. 7's admission to engaging in the same 'structuring' activity as defendant Devery was a sufficient factual basis for the judge to infer that the juror could not be impartial, as she might feel personally judged while evaluating the evidence against the defendant. Therefore, the judge was not required to ask Juror No. 7 if she could be fair before excusing her.
Analysis:
This decision formally establishes the concept of "inferable bias" within the Second Circuit, providing trial judges with a third doctrinal category for evaluating juror partiality. It bridges the gap between the rigid categories of actual bias (requiring an admission or demeanor-based finding) and implied bias (reserved for extreme circumstances). This ruling grants judges greater flexibility and discretion to ensure jury impartiality by allowing them to remove jurors whose specific life experiences are so similar to the facts of the case that their objectivity can be reasonably questioned, even without a confession of bias.
