United States v. Torrance James Lockett
2016 WL 240334, 810 F.3d 1262, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 992 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
For a prior state burglary conviction to qualify as a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), the state statute's elements must be the same as or narrower than generic burglary. If the state statute is broader, it can only serve as an ACCA predicate if it is 'divisible,' meaning it sets out alternative elements that create distinct crimes, allowing a sentencing court to determine that the defendant was convicted of the generic offense.
Facts:
- Torrance Lockett had prior felony convictions, including two for second-degree burglary in South Carolina.
- South Carolina's burglary statute defines the location of the crime, 'dwelling,' to include not just a house but also structures, vehicles, watercraft, and aircraft.
- This definition is broader than the 'generic' definition of burglary used in federal law, which is limited to a 'building or structure.'
- On February 3, 2014, a Tallahassee police officer received a tip that a person matching Lockett's description was carrying a handgun.
- The officer frisked Lockett, found a handgun on his person, and arrested him.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury charged Torrance Lockett with being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- Lockett pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court, the trial court of first instance.
- A presentence investigation report recommended an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on four prior burglary convictions.
- Lockett objected to the use of his two South Carolina burglary convictions as ACCA predicates.
- The District Court overruled the objection, found the convictions qualified, and sentenced Lockett to ACCA's mandatory minimum of 15 years in prison.
- Lockett (appellant) appealed his sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, with the United States as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a conviction under South Carolina's second-degree burglary statute, which defines 'dwelling' more broadly than generic burglary and does not require a jury to find which specific type of dwelling was entered, qualify as a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA) enumerated clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Martin, Circuit Judge
No. A conviction under South Carolina's second-degree burglary statute does not qualify as a 'violent felony' under ACCA because the statute is both broader than generic burglary and indivisible. The court's reasoning follows a two-step analysis established by the Supreme Court in cases like Taylor and Descamps. First, using the 'categorical approach,' the court compares the elements of the state crime to the 'generic' federal definition of burglary. South Carolina's definition of 'dwelling' is overbroad because it includes vehicles and watercraft, which are not 'buildings or structures' under the generic definition. Second, because the statute is overbroad, the court must determine if it is 'divisible,' meaning it lists alternative elements that create separate crimes. The court finds the South Carolina statute is indivisible because state law does not require a prosecutor to charge, or a jury to unanimously find, which specific type of dwelling was entered. The jury only needs to find entry into 'a dwelling' generally. Because the statute is overbroad and indivisible, a sentencing court cannot use the 'modified categorical approach' to examine underlying case documents to see if the defendant's conduct met the generic definition, as this would require a judge to make factual findings reserved for a jury under the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, the convictions cannot be used as ACCA predicates.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of the Supreme Court's ruling in Descamps v. United States within the Eleventh Circuit, clarifying the rigorous test for determining if a state statute is 'divisible' for ACCA purposes. The analysis establishes that divisibility hinges not on mere statutory phrasing (like the use of 'or'), but on whether state law treats the alternatives as distinct elements that a jury must unanimously find. This precedent constrains federal sentencing courts from making factual inquiries into the conduct underlying prior convictions, reinforcing the Sixth Amendment's protection against judicial fact-finding for sentence enhancements. Consequently, it makes it more difficult for prosecutors to use convictions from states with broadly worded criminal statutes as predicates for ACCA's mandatory minimum sentences.
