United States v. Thomas Jerome Dillon
1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 3833, 870 F.2d 1125, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 810 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, even if the flight occurs long after the commission of the crime, provided the flight is precipitated by an event that gives the defendant notice of his imminent prosecution or investigation.
Facts:
- Between December 1982 and March 26, 1983, Thomas J. Dillon supplied cocaine to Edward Knezevich.
- On March 26, 1983, Knezevich sold a pound of cocaine he received from Dillon to Sheila Bezotsky, who was an FBI informant.
- As a result of the transaction, Knezevich was arrested.
- On December 19, 1984, Knezevich informed Dillon that he had been subpoenaed and would testify truthfully before a Grand Jury the next day about Dillon's role in the cocaine deal.
- Six days later, on Christmas Day 1984, Dillon failed to keep a scheduled engagement to take custody of his children.
- For the subsequent two years, Dillon only contacted his ex-wife by telephone and did not reveal his location to her.
- In June 1987, FBI agents arrested Dillon in Florida, where he was living under an assumed name.
Procedural Posture:
- Thomas J. Dillon was indicted in federal court for multiple drug offenses.
- At trial in the U.S. District Court, the prosecution introduced evidence of Dillon's flight from Columbus, Ohio.
- Dillon's counsel made timely objections to the admission of the flight evidence and the corresponding jury instruction.
- The District Court overruled the objections, admitted the evidence, and instructed the jury on flight.
- The jury convicted Dillon on all counts.
- Dillon (appellant) appealed the conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing the trial court erred in admitting the flight evidence.
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Issue:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant's flight, which occurred nearly two years after the alleged crime but immediately after the defendant learned that his co-conspirator intended to testify against him before a grand jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Merritt, Circuit Judge
No, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Evidence of a defendant's flight can be highly probative of a guilty conscience, even when delayed, if it is triggered by an event that would spark fear of prosecution in a guilty person. The court applied a four-part test to determine the probative value of flight evidence, weighing the inferences from (1) behavior to flight, (2) flight to consciousness of guilt, (3) consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt for the specific crime charged, and (4) consciousness of guilt to actual guilt. Here, Dillon's disappearance, adoption of an alias, and the timing of his departure immediately after being warned by his co-conspirator provided a strong basis for all four inferences. The court rejected the argument that a postponed flight is only relevant if it occurs after an indictment, holding that learning a co-conspirator is about to testify is an equally powerful precipitating event.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'immediacy' element for the admissibility of flight evidence. It establishes that a substantial time gap between the crime and the flight does not render the evidence inadmissible if the flight is immediately preceded by a specific, triggering event. The ruling expands the category of what constitutes such a precipitating event beyond formal notice of charges to include informal notice, such as being told a co-conspirator will testify. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants to exclude evidence of their flight simply because it was not contemporaneous with the crime itself.
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