United States v. Thomas J. Maloney

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
71 F.3d 645 (1996)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Acts of concealment, such as witness tampering, committed after the last substantive offense can extend a RICO conspiracy for statute of limitations purposes if the conspiracy's main criminal objective is ongoing and has not been accomplished or abandoned. Returning a single bribe due to fear of detection, rather than renouncing the conspiracy's goals, does not constitute an affirmative withdrawal from the conspiracy.

Facts:

Beginning in 1977, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Thomas Maloney engaged in a pattern of accepting bribes to fix the outcomes of criminal cases.
In 1981, Maloney accepted a bribe, arranged through intermediaries Pat Marcy and Robert Cooley, to acquit three defendants in a murder case.
Throughout the early 1980s, Maloney accepted several other bribes through attorney William Swano and bagmen Lucius Robinson and Robert McGee to secure favorable outcomes for defendants in various cases.
In 1986, Maloney agreed to accept a $10,000 bribe from Swano to acquit El Rukn gang members Earl Hawkins and Nathan Fields of a double murder, on the condition that Swano present a convincing defense.
During the Hawkins/Fields trial, Maloney became alarmed by the strength of the prosecution's case and the presence of FBI agents, prompting him to return the $10,000 bribe to Swano.
Maloney subsequently found Hawkins and Fields guilty and sentenced them to death.
In late 1988 or early 1989, and again in the summer of 1990, after a federal grand jury investigation into his activities had begun, Maloney privately asked Swano if he was 'standing tall,' which Swano understood as an instruction to resist federal investigators.

Procedural Posture:

Thomas J. Maloney was indicted by a federal grand jury on June 26, 1991, on charges including racketeering conspiracy and obstruction of justice.
The case was tried before a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
On April 16, 1993, the jury returned a verdict convicting Maloney on all counts.
Maloney filed post-trial motions, including a motion for a new trial based on the government's alleged suppression of impeachment evidence concerning two witnesses.
The district court denied Maloney's post-trial motions.
Maloney, as appellant, appealed his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

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Issue:

Do acts of concealment, such as telling a co-conspirator to 'stand tall' against a federal investigation, extend a RICO conspiracy beyond its last substantive act of bribery for statute of limitations purposes when the conspiracy's ongoing objective has not been affirmatively abandoned?

Opinions:

Majority - Eschbach, Circuit Judge.

Yes, acts of concealment can extend a RICO conspiracy for statute of limitations purposes if the conspiracy remains ongoing. The court reasoned that the conspiracy's main criminal objective—to fix cases whenever feasible—was never accomplished or abandoned as long as Maloney remained on the bench and his co-conspirators were active. The court distinguished this from conspiracies with a discrete, completed goal, as described in Grunewald v. United States. Maloney's instructions to Swano to 'stand tall' were not mere post-conspiracy cover-ups but were acts in furtherance of the ongoing conspiracy because they were meant to preserve his position on the bench, which was essential to the conspiracy's ability to continue. Furthermore, Maloney's return of the Hawkins bribe was not a withdrawal; it was a 'deal gone sour' motivated by fear of detection, not an affirmative renunciation of the conspiracy's goals.

Dissenting - Ripple, Circuit Judge,

No, the acts of concealment should not extend the conspiracy for statute of limitations purposes. The jury should have been allowed to determine whether the return of the bribe on June 19, 1986, constituted a withdrawal from the conspiracy, which would have placed all subsequent acts outside the five-year statute of limitations. The dissent argues that under Grunewald, the 'standing tall' conversations were quintessential acts of concealment done after the central objectives had been attained or, in this case, failed. Characterizing the conspiracy as ongoing for as long as Maloney was a judge creates a conspiracy of 'unlimited duration,' which conflicts with the principle that cover-up activities do not extend a conspiracy's timeline. The jury's view of this issue was also impermissibly skewed because it was not aware of government misconduct that would have impeached a key witness's testimony about when the bribe was returned.

Analysis:

This decision clarifies the application of the statute of limitations to long-running RICO conspiracies, particularly those without a single, defined endpoint. It reinforces the high burden for a defendant to prove withdrawal, holding that returning proceeds from a single failed act is insufficient without an affirmative disavowal of the entire criminal enterprise. The ruling distinguishes between mere post-crime cover-ups, which do not extend a conspiracy under Grunewald, and acts of concealment that preserve an ongoing conspiracy's viability. This makes it more difficult for defendants in continuous criminal enterprises, like judicial corruption, to argue the statute of limitations has run if they take steps to conceal their activities after their last known substantive crime.

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