United States v. Thomas
2013 WL 6133213, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23564, 736 F.3d 54 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
The exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence derived from a Fourth Amendment violation if the police conduct was not deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, and the connection between the initial violation and the subsequent use of the evidence is significantly attenuated by time and circumstance.
Facts:
- In 2004, threatening letters were sent to Austin Preparatory School in Massachusetts from a postal area in Maine where alumnus Michael R. Thomas lived.
- In January 2005, U.S. Postal Inspectors obtained a grand jury subpoena form from the U.S. Attorney's Office, without actual grand jury or judicial involvement, compelling Thomas to provide a DNA sample.
- Inspectors served the subpoena on Thomas, who complied by providing a buccal (cheek) swab at a local police station.
- In February 2006, the resulting DNA analysis excluded Thomas as the source of DNA on the 2004 letters.
- The 2004-2005 investigation was closed in June 2006; Thomas's physical DNA sample was destroyed, but his DNA profile was retained in the closed investigative file.
- In early 2011, new threatening letters were sent to public officials, including the Governor of Maine, and investigators recovered a DNA sample from one of the letters.
- In March 2011, a postal inspector involved in the 2005 investigation, Michael Desrosiers, remembered Thomas from a past investigation due to a shared address and retrieved the 2005 case file.
- The Maine State Police Laboratory compared Thomas's 2005 DNA profile to the DNA from the 2011 letters and found a match, which formed the sole basis for warrants against Thomas.
Procedural Posture:
- In the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, Michael R. Thomas filed a motion to suppress all evidence derived from the 2005 DNA sample and profile.
- The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied Thomas's motion to suppress.
- Thomas entered a conditional plea of guilty to multiple federal charges, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
- Thomas, as the appellant, appealed the district court's ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the exclusionary rule require the suppression of evidence in a 2011 criminal prosecution that was derived from a DNA profile obtained in 2005 through a Fourth Amendment violation, where the initial police conduct was not flagrant and the subsequent investigation was for new, unrelated crimes?
Opinions:
Majority - Lynch, Chief Judge
No. The exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the evidence because the benefits of deterrence do not outweigh the social costs in this case. Although the initial 2005 collection of Thomas's DNA via a pro forma grand jury subpoena was a search that violated the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule's application is not automatic. Applying the test from Herring v. United States, suppression is only warranted for deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent police conduct. The court found no evidence that the postal inspectors in 2005 knowingly engaged in misconduct, as the law regarding DNA collection via subpoena was unsettled at the time. Furthermore, the connection between the 2005 violation and the 2011 investigation was highly attenuated; it was separated by six years, involved new and unforeseen crimes, and the link was made through happenstance. The court also concluded that the retention of the DNA profile in a closed case file, akin to a fingerprint card, was not a separate constitutional violation and did not contravene any statute. Given the lack of flagrant misconduct and the significant attenuation, the deterrent value of exclusion is minimal and is outweighed by the costs to the justice system.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits the application of the exclusionary rule by emphasizing the attenuation doctrine and the requirement of culpable police conduct. It establishes that evidence from an old, non-flagrant Fourth Amendment violation can be admissible in a new, unrelated investigation, particularly when the link is fortuitous and separated by a long period. This narrows the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, allowing law enforcement to use information from closed case files even if its initial acquisition was unconstitutional, so long as the original error was not deliberate or egregious. The case reinforces the Supreme Court's trend, post-Herring, of viewing exclusion as a last resort rather than an automatic remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.
