United States v. Texas
599 U.S. 670 (2023)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff, including a state, lacks Article III standing to challenge the Executive Branch's discretionary enforcement policies, such as those governing arrests and prosecutions, by seeking to compel more enforcement actions against third parties.
Facts:
- In 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, promulgated new "Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law."
- These Guidelines prioritized the apprehension and removal of noncitizens deemed to be threats to national security, public safety, and border security.
- This meant focusing on noncitizens who were suspected terrorists, dangerous criminals, or who had unlawfully entered the country very recently.
- The states of Texas and Louisiana claimed this policy contravened federal statutes (8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2)) that, in their view, mandated the arrest of a broader category of noncitizens with criminal records.
- The states asserted that the federal government's failure to arrest and detain these individuals imposed significant costs on them for services such as incarceration, law enforcement, healthcare, and education.
Procedural Posture:
- The states of Texas and Louisiana sued the United States and the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
- After a bench trial, the District Court found the States had standing and that the new immigration Guidelines were unlawful.
- The District Court issued an order vacating the Guidelines nationwide.
- The United States appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which declined to issue a stay of the District Court's judgment.
- The United States then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment with the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Court granted.
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Issue:
Does a state have Article III standing to challenge a federal immigration enforcement policy on the grounds that the policy's alleged under-enforcement imposes financial costs on the state?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kavanaugh
No. A state lacks Article III standing to challenge a federal immigration enforcement policy because it has no judicially cognizable interest in the Executive Branch's arrest or prosecution policies regarding third parties. Citing Linda R. S. v. Richard D., the Court held that a party lacks standing to contest the enforcement policies of a prosecuting authority when that party is not the one being prosecuted. Such lawsuits are not traditionally entertained by federal courts because they intrude upon the Executive's core Article II authority to enforce the law and its inherent enforcement discretion. Courts lack meaningful standards to judge such discretionary decisions, which are invariably shaped by resource constraints and shifting public safety needs. Allowing such suits would open the door for courts to extensively direct executive enforcement in numerous areas of law, which is inconsistent with the separation of powers.
Concurring in the judgment - Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch agreed that the States lack standing, but for a different reason: their injury is not redressable by a federal court. Even if the States' alleged injury is cognizable, there is no effective remedy the court can provide. A federal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), explicitly prohibits lower courts from issuing injunctions to restrain the operation of these immigration laws. Furthermore, a judicial order merely 'vacating' the challenged Guidelines would not compel federal officials to alter their enforcement priorities, as they would retain their underlying prosecutorial discretion. Justice Gorsuch also expressed significant skepticism about whether the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes the remedy of universal vacatur at all, arguing it is inconsistent with the traditional, party-specific nature of judicial relief.
Concurring in the judgment - Justice Barrett
Justice Barrett agreed with Justice Gorsuch that the States lack standing because their claimed injuries are not redressable. She argued that the majority's reliance on Linda R. S. created a new, broad rule of standing rather than applying settled principles. In her view, the majority improperly imported merits-based questions, such as the scope of Executive power under the Take Care Clause and statutory interpretation from Castle Rock v. Gonzales, into the Article III standing analysis. The case should have been resolved on the more familiar and narrow ground that the States failed to show that a favorable court decision would actually remedy their alleged harm.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
Yes. Texas has standing because it satisfies the traditional three-part test of injury, traceability, and redressability. The District Court made factual findings that the federal policy inflicted substantial and quantifiable financial harm on the State, which is a classic form of injury-in-fact. The majority's decision brushes aside the controlling precedent of Massachusetts v. EPA, where a state was found to have standing to challenge the Executive's failure to undertake a civil enforcement action. By creating a new categorical rule against standing to challenge non-enforcement, the Court improperly inflates executive power, undermines Congress's clear statutory mandates, and leaves states powerless to protect their vital interests against federal policies that cause them direct harm.
Analysis:
This decision significantly insulates the Executive Branch's law enforcement discretion from judicial review, particularly in the contentious area of immigration. By framing the issue as a lack of a 'judicially cognizable interest' rather than a failure of traditional standing elements, the Court establishes a strong, categorical barrier against lawsuits that seek to compel more aggressive enforcement of federal law. This approach effectively treats such disputes as political questions best resolved by Congress and the electoral process, rather than by courts. The ruling narrows the applicability of precedents like Massachusetts v. EPA and creates a new obstacle for states seeking to challenge federal policies based on the indirect financial costs they impose.
