United States v. Taylor
596 U.S. 845 (2022)
Rule of Law:
Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(A) because, applying a categorical approach, no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force.
Facts:
- Justin Taylor participated in an attempted robbery during which his accomplice shot a man.
- Federal prosecutors charged Taylor with violating the Hobbs Act (18 U. S. C. §1951(a)), which makes it a federal crime to commit, attempt, or conspire to commit a robbery with an interstate component.
- Prosecutors also charged Taylor with committing a "crime of violence" under 18 U. S. C. §924(c), which authorizes enhanced punishments for those who use a firearm in connection with such a crime.
- Section 924(c) defines a "crime of violence" under two clauses: (A) the "elements clause," covering offenses with an element requiring the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, and (B) the "residual clause," covering offenses involving a substantial risk of physical force.
- Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of violating the Hobbs Act and one count of violating §924(c).
Procedural Posture:
- Federal prosecutors charged Justin Taylor in a U.S. District Court with violating the Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. §924(c).
- Taylor pleaded guilty in the District Court to one count of violating the Hobbs Act and one count of violating §924(c).
- The District Court sentenced Taylor to 30 years in federal prison, which included an additional 10 years for the §924(c) conviction.
- Taylor later filed a federal habeas petition (a request to review his conviction) in the District Court, arguing his §924(c) conviction was no longer valid after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis (which struck down §924(c)(3)(B)'s residual clause as unconstitutional).
- The government maintained that Taylor’s §924(c) conviction remained sound because attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause (§924(c)(3)(A)).
- The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the dispute and held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under §924(c)(3)(A).
- The Fourth Circuit vacated Taylor's §924(c) conviction and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing.
- The United States (the government) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualify as a "crime of violence" under 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(A)'s elements clause, which defines such a crime as one that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another"?
Opinions:
Majority - Gorsuch
No, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force. The Court applies a "categorical approach," meaning the inquiry focuses solely on whether the elements of the federal felony, as defined by statute, always require the government to prove the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, rather than how any particular defendant may have committed the crime. To convict someone of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove (1) the defendant intended to unlawfully take property by force or threat, and (2) they completed a "substantial step" toward that end. While a "substantial step" requires more than mere preparation, it does not inherently require the government to prove the actual use, attempted use, or even threatened use of force. For example, a person could be arrested after extensive planning and preparation (a substantial step) but before ever confronting or communicating a threat to a victim. The term "threatened use" in the elements clause typically denotes a communicated intent to inflict harm, not an abstract risk, which differentiates it from the now-invalidated residual clause. Furthermore, the Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez standard, which permits an empirical inquiry into how a crime is usually committed, does not apply here; that standard is limited to federal courts interpreting state statutes to determine if they cover conduct beyond a generic federal definition. Since attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not categorically require proof of the elements demanded by §924(c)(3)(A), it cannot serve as a predicate "crime of violence" for enhanced sentencing.
Dissenting - Thomas
No, Taylor's conviction for using a firearm during an attempted Hobbs Act robbery should be upheld because his actual conduct was undeniably violent, and the Court's categorical approach to defining a "crime of violence" leads to absurd results. Justice Thomas argues that the Court's application of the categorical approach, especially after nullifying the residual clause of §924(c) in United States v. Davis, prevents genuinely violent crimes from being recognized as "crimes of violence." He contends that Davis was wrongly decided and should be overruled, and a conduct-based approach should be adopted for the residual clause, allowing courts to consider the defendant's actual actions as established by a jury or plea agreement. Under such an approach, Taylor's admitted conduct—an attempted armed robbery during which a victim was shot and killed—would clearly qualify as involving a "substantial risk that physical force" would be used. The current framework forces courts to invent "improbable hypotheticals" of how a crime could be committed non-violently, rather than addressing the real-world violence of the defendant's actions, thereby frustrating congressional intent to punish violent firearm offenders.
Dissenting - Alito
Yes, Taylor's offense of attempted Hobbs Act robbery does meet the technical definition of a "crime of violence" under §924(c)(3)(A), even under a strict textual reading and a version of the categorical approach. Justice Alito asserts that the Court's interpretation of "an element" is too narrow. He explains that criminal statutes often include alternative elements, where proving one of several is sufficient for conviction (e.g., Hobbs Act robbery can be committed "by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury"). If a defendant intends to commit Hobbs Act robbery by means of "actual force" and takes a substantial step, then the "offense" of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in that specific instance, "has as an element the use . . . of physical force against the person . . . of another." He argues that the government's concession that the offense must always require proof of force for every possible permutation of the crime is incorrect and should not alter the meaning of the law. Even if a modified categorical approach (which examines plea documents) were used, Taylor's plea agreement admitted his intent to use force and his substantial steps, which would be sufficient to establish the element of attempted use of force.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the Supreme Court's commitment to a strict categorical approach when interpreting §924(c)(3)(A)'s elements clause, effectively limiting its reach to only those crimes whose statutory definition always requires proof of physical force. By rejecting consideration of a defendant's actual conduct or the typical manner in which an offense is committed, the Court further narrows the scope of what constitutes a "crime of violence," especially after the invalidation of the residual clause in United States v. Davis. This makes it more challenging for prosecutors to apply enhanced sentences under §924(c) to attempted offenses that may involve significant violence in practice but do not, on their face, require specific elements of force. The ruling deepens the divide between statutory interpretation and perceived real-world justice in criminal sentencing.
