United States v. Talman Harris
881 F.3d 945 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
A district court abuses its discretion by preventing a defendant from impeaching a key government witness with a prior inconsistent statement that is "irreconcilably at odds" with trial testimony, especially when such impeachment concerns a non-collateral issue and evidence on that charge is not substantial. Furthermore, a district court abuses its discretion by failing to investigate a defendant's "colorable claim of extraneous influence" on a juror, which triggers a duty to conduct a hearing or allow investigation to protect Sixth Amendment rights.
Facts:
- From 2007 to 2014, Talman Harris was a registered stockbroker with various securities firms in New York.
- Harris and co-conspirator Guy Durand participated in a scheme to recommend shares of Zirk de Maison's companies to clients in exchange for undisclosed commissions.
- The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) began investigating Harris and Durand concerning wire transfers from organizations controlled by de Maison.
- Harris and Durand agreed to provide a fictitious explanation to FINRA, stating that the deposits resulted from selling expensive watches, and they sent letters to FINRA summarizing this false account.
- When FINRA specifically inquired if Zirk Engelbrecht (de Maison) had any connection to the wire transfers, Harris and Durand replied that he did not.
- After Harris's arrest, he allegedly called and texted Durand on multiple occasions, instructing him to maintain their agreed-upon story: "Remember, we sold watches."
- Durand later admitted to officers that the watch story was entirely false.
- During Harris's trial, Christian Goleno, the live-in girlfriend of Juror Number 12, viewed Harris's LinkedIn profile sometime between August 28 and September 12, 2016, a period during which the trial was ongoing and concluded.
- Information regarding FINRA's investigation of Harris, which led to his permanent bar, was publicly available on the first page of Google search results for his name, and this information was precluded from being presented at Harris's trial.
Procedural Posture:
- In September 2016, a jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio convicted Talman Harris of one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud or wire fraud, one count of obstruction of justice, and three counts of wire fraud.
- The district court sentenced Harris to 63 months’ imprisonment, a five-year term of supervised release, a $500 special assessment, and $843,423.91 in restitution.
- Harris, as Defendant-Appellant, appealed his criminal convictions and sentences to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, challenging the district court's rulings on witness impeachment, admission of summary evidence, jury instructions on fiduciary duties, and failure to investigate potential extraneous juror influence.
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Issue:
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by barring Talman Harris from impeaching government witness Guy Durand with a prior inconsistent statement regarding the obstruction of justice charge? 2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing or allow investigation into potential extraneous influence on a juror, following evidence that the juror's live-in girlfriend viewed the defendant's online profile during trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Siler, Circuit Judge
1. Yes, the district court abused its discretion by not allowing Harris to introduce Durand's prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes. The district court improperly applied Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), which governs character evidence, instead of Rule 613(b), which governs prior inconsistent statements. Durand testified at trial that he viewed Harris’s statement, “Remember, we sold watches,” as an invitation to make a false statement to the FBI. However, Harris's counsel proffered a recorded statement where Durand told Harris’s private investigator that Harris was essentially saying to “tell the truth and leave it at that,” a statement "irreconcilably at odds" with his trial testimony. This error was not harmless because Durand was the sole government witness on the obstruction of justice charge, and his testimony was largely uncorroborated, making the preclusion of impeachment substantial. 2. No, the district court did not err in admitting government summary exhibits. Exhibits 303 and 346 were "trade blotters" created by clearing firms as part of their regular business practice, making them admissible under the business-records exception (Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)) and thus not subject to Rule 1006's underlying documentation requirements for summaries. Regarding exhibits 320 and 610, the district court properly found them valid summary evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, as the government had produced all underlying bank records and clearing firm records months before trial and informed defense counsel that certain public market data was available. 3. No, the district court did not err in instructing the jury that a stockbroker owes certain fiduciary duties to clients. The instruction, which stated that a fiduciary has a duty to disclose all material facts concerning transactions (including stock recommendations) and that concealment of material information can be a breach of fiduciary duty, was a fair and adequate explanation of the law. Consistent with precedent such as United States v. Skelly, particular factual circumstances can create a fiduciary duty between a broker and customer, even if there is no general fiduciary duty inherent in an ordinary broker/customer relationship. 4. Yes, the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing or allow Harris's counsel to question Juror 12 and Goleno regarding potential extraneous influence. Harris presented a "colorable claim of extraneous influence" under Remmer v. United States by showing that Juror 12's live-in girlfriend, Christian Goleno, viewed Harris's LinkedIn profile during the trial period. Given that prejudicial information about Harris (FINRA investigation leading to permanent bar) was easily discoverable via a simple Google search, and the close relationship between Goleno and Juror 12, the possibility that inadmissible information was communicated to the juror necessitated an investigation to safeguard Harris's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
Analysis:
This case provides crucial guidance on evidentiary rules concerning impeachment and the constitutional right to an impartial jury. It clarifies that Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) governs prior inconsistent statements, distinct from the limitations of Rule 608(b) on character evidence, thereby reinforcing a defendant's ability to challenge witness credibility on substantive issues. More significantly, the ruling underscores the critical importance of a district court's duty under Remmer v. United States to investigate any "colorable claim of extraneous influence" on a juror. This highlights that even indirect exposure to prejudicial information through a juror's close associate can trigger this duty, requiring an evidentiary hearing to protect the integrity of the judicial process and a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. The decision serves as a strong reminder for trial courts to diligently guard against both improper evidentiary exclusions and potential jury misconduct.
