United States v. Stevens
2011 WL 1033707, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30107, 771 F. Supp. 2d 556 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
The federal obstruction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, is a specific intent crime requiring proof of consciousness of wrongdoing. Consequently, a defendant's good faith reliance on the advice of counsel can negate the requisite mens rea, and a prosecutor's erroneous instruction to a grand jury that this defense is irrelevant to its probable cause determination may warrant dismissal of the indictment.
Facts:
- On October 9, 2002, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sent a letter to GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) inquiring about the company's possible off-label promotion of the drug Wellbutrin for weight loss.
- The FDA requested that GSK provide copies of all materials related to its Wellbutrin promotional programs.
- Lauren Stevens, GSK's Vice President and Associate General Counsel, was in charge of leading a team of lawyers and paralegals to prepare GSK's response to the FDA.
- In responding to the FDA, Stevens was assisted by both in-house GSK counsel and outside counsel from the law firm of King & Spalding.
- The government alleges that Stevens withheld certain documents, such as speaker slide sets promoting off-label use, from the FDA.
- The government also alleges that Stevens sent six letters to the FDA that contained materially false statements regarding GSK's promotional activities for Wellbutrin.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland returned a six-count indictment against Lauren Stevens, including one count under 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
- The United States filed a pretrial motion to preclude Stevens from asserting an advice of counsel defense to the § 1519 charge, arguing it was a general intent crime.
- Stevens filed several pretrial motions, including a motion for disclosure of the government's presentation to the grand jury.
- In response to Stevens's motion, the court reviewed the grand jury transcripts in camera and disclosed a relevant excerpt to the parties for further briefing.
- The District Court held a hearing on the parties' pretrial motions.
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Issue:
Does the federal obstruction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, require specific intent, thereby allowing a defendant to assert good faith reliance on the advice of counsel to negate the element of wrongful intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Titus, J.
Yes. The federal obstruction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, requires specific intent, and therefore a good faith reliance on the advice of counsel defense is available to negate the statute's element of wrongful intent. The court reasoned that the text of § 1519, which prohibits 'knowingly' altering documents 'with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence' an investigation, requires a 'consciousness of wrongdoing.' Citing the Supreme Court's analysis of a similar statute in Arthur Andersen, the court found that the phrase 'with intent to impede' imposes the same 'sinister mentality' as the word 'corruptly' in other obstruction laws. Because § 1519 is a specific intent crime, the 'advice of counsel defense' is not a true affirmative defense but rather evidence that negates the essential element of wrongful intent. The court further held that because the prosecutors erroneously instructed the grand jury that this defense was irrelevant to their determination of probable cause, and this incorrect advice went to the 'heart of the intent required to indict,' there was grave doubt about the validity of the indictment, requiring its dismissal without prejudice.
Analysis:
This opinion provides a significant clarification of the mens rea requirement for 18 U.S.C. § 1519, firmly establishing it as a specific intent crime. This holding provides critical protection for in-house and outside counsel who respond to government investigations, confirming that their good faith reliance on legal advice can shield them from criminal liability for obstruction. The decision also serves as a potent reminder to federal prosecutors of their obligation to provide accurate legal instructions to grand juries, especially concerning defenses that negate an element of the charged offense. The dismissal of the indictment underscores that a failure to do so can jeopardize the entire prosecution by creating 'grave doubt' as to whether the grand jury would have indicted had it been properly instructed.
