United States v. Stevens
559 U.S. ____ (2010) (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A federal statute seeking to ban a category of speech is an unconstitutional content-based restriction if it is substantially overbroad, meaning it criminalizes a significant amount of constitutionally protected speech. The First Amendment does not permit the government to create new categories of unprotected speech through a simple balancing of the speech's value against its social costs.
Facts:
- Robert J. Stevens operated a business named "Dogs of Velvet and Steel" and an associated website.
- Through his business, Stevens sold videos that depicted pit bulls engaging in dogfights and attacking other animals.
- Some of the videos, such as "Japan Pit Fights," included contemporary footage of dogfights in Japan, where the conduct was allegedly legal.
- Other videos contained footage of American dogfights from the 1960s and 1970s.
- A third video, "Catch Dogs and Country Living," showed pit bulls being used to hunt wild boar and attacking a domestic farm pig.
- The federal law Stevens was prosecuted under, 18 U.S.C. § 48, was enacted with the primary goal of stopping the trade in "crush videos," which depict the torture and killing of small animals for a specific sexual fetish.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Stevens was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for violating 18 U.S.C. § 48.
- The District Court denied Stevens's motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment grounds.
- Following a jury trial, Stevens was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 37 months in prison.
- Stevens, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
- The en banc Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment, holding the statute was facially unconstitutional.
- The United States, as petitioner, sought a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does 18 U.S.C. § 48, which criminalizes the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
Yes, 18 U.S.C. § 48 violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Court rejected the government's proposal to create a new categorical exception for depictions of animal cruelty, holding that the First Amendment does not permit a simple balancing test of a speech category's value against its societal costs. The statute is a content-based restriction on speech and is substantially overbroad because its plain language criminalizes a wide range of protected speech far beyond its intended target of "crush videos." The Court reasoned that the statute's definition of a "depiction of animal cruelty" is not limited to depictions of extreme or wanton cruelty, but could encompass any depiction where an animal is "wounded" or "killed" in violation of any state or federal law. This could unconstitutionally punish depictions of legal hunting if sold in a jurisdiction where that type of hunting is banned (e.g., Washington D.C.), or depictions of standard livestock slaughter practices. The statute's exception for depictions with "serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value" fails to cure this overbreadth, as "serious" sets a high bar and much constitutionally protected speech, like recreational hunting videos, would not qualify.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
No, the statute should not be held facially unconstitutional. The Court should have first considered whether the statute was constitutional as applied to Stevens's dogfighting videos before resorting to the "strong medicine" of the overbreadth doctrine. The majority's overbreadth analysis is flawed because the statute can and should be interpreted narrowly to avoid constitutional issues. The term "animal cruelty" should be read to apply only to acts of cruelty, which would exempt depictions of lawful hunting and standard agricultural practices, as most state anti-cruelty laws already do. The statute's legitimate applications—targeting horrific and valueless material like "crush videos" and depictions of animal fighting—are substantial. Drawing on the reasoning of New York v. Ferber, which held child pornography is unprotected, the dissent argued that crush videos and dogfighting videos are intrinsically linked to the underlying violent crimes, have no social value, and can only be stopped by targeting their commercial trade. Therefore, the statute is not substantially overbroad relative to its plainly legitimate sweep.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the high barrier against creating new categories of unprotected speech, firmly rejecting a flexible balancing test that would allow courts to weigh a speech's social value against its costs. It sends a clear message to Congress that laws restricting speech, even speech related to abhorrent conduct, must be drafted with extreme precision to avoid being struck down as overbroad. The ruling solidifies the principle that the First Amendment protects a vast range of expression, including depictions of illegal or offensive acts, unless the speech falls within a narrow, historically recognized exception. Consequently, any future attempts to regulate harmful depictions will require a much more narrowly tailored statute that cannot be interpreted to criminalize substantial amounts of protected speech.
