United States v. Stanley
483 U.S. 669 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A Bivens remedy is not available for injuries to servicemembers that arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.
Facts:
- In February 1958, James B. Stanley, a master sergeant in the U.S. Army, volunteered for a program he believed was designed to test protective clothing and equipment for chemical warfare.
- Pursuant to an Army plan to study the drug's effects, Stanley was secretly administered lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) on four separate occasions.
- As a result of the LSD exposure, Stanley suffered from severe long-term effects including hallucinations, memory loss, and violent personality changes that led him to beat his wife and children.
- Stanley's military performance was impaired, and he was discharged from the Army in 1969.
- His marriage dissolved a year later due to the personality changes caused by the drug.
- The Army first notified Stanley that he had been administered LSD in a 1975 letter, 17 years after the experiment.
Procedural Posture:
- After the Army denied his administrative claim for compensation, James Stanley sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (a federal trial court).
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the government, finding the suit was barred by the Feres doctrine.
- Stanley appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the FTCA dismissal but remanded the case, holding that Stanley could amend his complaint to add constitutional claims (Bivens claims) against individual officers.
- On remand, Stanley added the Bivens claims. The District Court again dismissed the FTCA claim but refused to dismiss the Bivens claims against the individual officers.
- The District Court certified its order refusing to dismiss the Bivens claims for an immediate, interlocutory appeal.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal and affirmed the District Court, holding that the Bivens suit could proceed. It also instructed the lower court to reconsider the dismissed FTCA claim.
- The individual federal officers, as petitioners, were granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the 'incident to service' doctrine, established in Feres v. United States, bar a servicemember from bringing a Bivens action to recover damages from individual federal officials for constitutional violations?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
Yes, the 'incident to service' doctrine bars a Bivens action for such injuries. The 'special factors counselling hesitation' that preclude a Bivens remedy are as extensive as the Feres doctrine's exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The unique disciplinary structure of the military and Congress's plenary constitutional authority to regulate the armed forces constitute special factors that make it inappropriate for courts to create a damages remedy for injuries arising out of activity 'incident to service.' This bright-line rule avoids judicial inquiry into military matters, which would disrupt the military regime, regardless of whether the defendants are the plaintiff's superior officers or whether an adequate alternative remedy exists.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Brennan
No, the doctrine should not bar a Bivens action for intentional constitutional violations that do not implicate the direct command relationship. The Court's decision is an abdication of judicial responsibility that confers absolute immunity on federal officials for egregious constitutional violations without any showing that it is essential for military discipline. The narrow exception created in Chappell v. Wallace was limited to suits against direct superior officers to protect the chain of command, a concern not present here. The government's conduct was a morally and legally unacceptable violation of the Nuremberg Code, and for victims like Stanley, 'it is damages or nothing.'
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice O'Connor
No, while the 'incident to service' doctrine generally bars Bivens claims, the conduct alleged here is so outrageous that as a matter of law it cannot be considered 'incident to service.' The involuntary and unknowing human experimentation alleged in this case is so far beyond the bounds of human decency that it cannot be considered a part of the military mission. No judicially crafted rule should insulate from liability the deliberate and calculated exposure of healthy military personnel to medical experimentation without their consent.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands the scope of intramilitary immunity, effectively foreclosing all Bivens actions for servicemembers injured in the course of their service. It shifts the precedent from a narrow rule based on the superior-subordinate relationship (Chappell) to a broad, categorical bar based on the plaintiff's status and the context of the injury (Feres). The ruling solidifies judicial deference to military affairs, prioritizing the perceived need to protect military discipline over providing a remedy for even the most severe and intentional constitutional violations against servicemembers. This creates a zone of absolute immunity for government officials whose actions harm military personnel in a service-related context.
