United States v. Smith
18 U.S. 153, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820)
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Rule of Law:
Congress may constitutionally define the crime of piracy by reference to the law of nations. The law of nations provides a sufficiently certain definition of piracy as robbery upon the high seas.
Facts:
- The prisoner was charged with committing plunder and robbery on the high seas.
- The acts were committed by the prisoner and his associates.
- At the time of the offense, the prisoner and his associates were 'freebooters upon the sea.'
- They were not acting under the acknowledged authority, flag, or commission of any government.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States indicted the prisoner in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Virginia.
- The indictment charged the prisoner under an Act of Congress that punishes 'piracy, as defined by the law of nations.'
- A jury returned a special verdict finding the prisoner guilty of the plunder and robbery as charged in the indictment.
- The judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion on the question of whether the prisoner's acts constituted piracy punishable under the statute.
- The question was certified to the Supreme Court of the United States for resolution.
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Issue:
Is it a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to 'define and punish piracies' to enact a statute that punishes 'the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations,' without enumerating the specific acts constituting the crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Story
Yes. A federal statute that punishes piracy by referencing its definition under the law of nations is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power. The power 'to define' does not require a detailed legislative enumeration of all facts constituting the offense. Congress may define a crime by using a term of a known and determinate meaning, such as those found in common law or the law of nations. The principle is that 'which is by necessary reference made certain' is sufficiently defined. The crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with reasonable certainty as robbery or forcible depredations upon the sea, animo furandi (with intent to steal). This definition is universally recognized by jurists, in maritime law, and by the general practice of nations, thus providing a constitutionally adequate standard.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Livingston
No. The statute is not a constitutional exercise of Congress's power because it fails to adequately 'define' piracy. The framers gave Congress the power to define piracy precisely because the definition under the law of nations was uncertain and varied among different legal writers. Congress’s duty was to resolve this ambiguity by creating a clear, precise statutory definition, not to refer citizens back to the uncertain source. Criminal statutes, particularly those imposing the death penalty, must provide explicit and clear notice of the prohibited conduct. Referencing an amorphous body of international law is insufficient and is contrary to the constitutional requirement for Congress itself to define the crime.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that Congress can constitutionally incorporate established legal definitions by reference, particularly from international and common law, when legislating criminal offenses. It affirms that the law of nations is part of United States law and can be used by courts to ascertain the meaning of federal statutes. This grants Congress flexibility, but the dissent's due process concerns regarding fair notice remain a point of legal debate. The ruling solidifies the federal government's authority to prosecute international crimes based on widely accepted global norms, setting a precedent for how U.S. law interacts with international legal standards.
