United States v. Slatten
865 F.3d 767 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is violated by the imposition of a mandatory 30-year minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as applied to private security contractors using government-issued automatic weapons required for their jobs in a war zone. Additionally, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) confers jurisdiction over non-DOD federal contractors whose employment, at the time of the offense, relates to supporting the DOD's mission overseas, a standard which is interpreted broadly.
Facts:
- Nicholas Slatten, Paul Slough, Evan Liberty, and Dustin Heard were private contractors for Blackwater Worldwide Security, which held a contract with the U.S. State Department to provide security in Iraq in 2007.
- On September 16, 2007, their team, Raven 23, was dispatched in Baghdad to support the evacuation of a U.S. diplomat after a nearby car bomb explosion.
- The Raven 23 team leader disregarded orders and directed the four-vehicle convoy into Nisur Square, a busy traffic circle, with the intent to "lock it down."
- After the convoy stopped and halted all traffic, shots were fired from a Raven 23 vehicle, striking a white Kia sedan and killing its driver, Ahmed Al-Rubia'y.
- Heavy and indiscriminate gunfire from the Raven 23 convoy erupted, targeting the Kia with machine guns and grenades, which killed the passenger and set the car on fire.
- The shooting continued as civilians in the square sought cover or attempted to flee.
- During a pause to tow a disabled vehicle, a Raven 23 member saw an unidentified Blackwater guard shoot an Iraqi man in the stomach while his hands were in the air.
- By the time the convoy exited the square, at least 31 Iraqi civilians had been killed or wounded.
Procedural Posture:
- The U.S. government indicted Slatten, Slough, Liberty, and Heard in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for voluntary manslaughter, attempted manslaughter, and firearms offenses.
- The district court dismissed the indictment against all defendants, finding the prosecution's case was tainted by compelled statements under Kastigar v. United States.
- On appeal by the government, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the dismissal as to Slough, Liberty, and Heard and remanded, but effectively let the dismissal stand for Slatten.
- A new grand jury returned indictments against the defendants, but Slatten successfully challenged the manslaughter charge against him as time-barred, a result confirmed by the D.C. Circuit via a writ of mandamus.
- The government then secured a new indictment charging Slatten with first-degree murder, which has no statute of limitations.
- The defendants were tried jointly in the district court, where a jury found them guilty on nearly all counts.
- The district court sentenced Slatten to life in prison and sentenced Slough, Liberty, and Heard to the mandatory minimum of 30 years in prison plus one day.
- The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the imposition of a mandatory 30-year minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when applied to private security contractors convicted of manslaughter for using government-issued automatic weapons in a war zone?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. The imposition of the mandatory 30-year minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), as applied to these defendants, violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court found this to be one of the 'exceedingly rare' cases where a legislatively mandated sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime. The core purpose of § 924(c) is to deter individuals from bringing dangerous weapons to a crime, a purpose not implicated here, as the defendants were required by their employment to carry these specific weapons in a war zone. The court reasoned that the defendants' culpability stemmed from panic and poor judgment, not a premeditated plan to use automatic weapons to commit a crime, and that the 'one-size-fits-all' nature of the sentence prevents individualized consideration. The court also held that (1) jurisdiction under MEJA was proper because the defendants' security work for the State Department 'related to' the DOD's mission by freeing up military personnel; (2) Slatten's first-degree murder conviction is vacated because the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever, which would have allowed him to introduce a co-defendant's exculpatory statements under the residual hearsay exception; and (3) Slatten's re-indictment on a murder charge did not constitute vindictive prosecution because the government had an objective justification after Slatten's successful statute of limitations challenge to the initial charges.
Concurring - Henderson
Yes, but for a different reason. I agree that Slatten's re-indictment was not vindictive, but I do not believe a presumption of vindictiveness ever arose. The government's decision to seek a murder indictment was a forced choice resulting from a complex procedural history, which included a prior mistake by this very court regarding Slatten's dismissal status. Therefore, the government's action was not a retaliatory response to Slatten exercising his rights but a direct consequence of a unique and confusing procedural posture.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Rogers
No. The 30-year sentences for Slough, Liberty, and Heard do not violate the Eighth Amendment. The majority wrongly analyzes the 30-year sentence in isolation, ignoring that the district court judge constructed a 'sentencing package' where he imposed the mandatory 30 years for the weapons charge but only one additional day for all of the numerous manslaughter and attempted manslaughter convictions. The trial judge explicitly stated he was 'very satisfied' that the total sentence was appropriate for the 'many killings and woundings' for which the defendants were responsible, thus already mitigating any potential disproportionality. I concur, however, in the judgment to vacate Slatten's conviction, but argue the co-defendant's statements were admissible under the 'statement against interest' exception (Rule 804(b)(3)), not the majority's broader application of the residual hearsay exception.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Brown
I dissent from the majority's jurisdictional analysis. The court's interpretation of MEJA is overly broad and reads the limiting phrase 'to the extent' out of the statute. MEJA should only apply when a non-DOD contractor is performing a specific task that is integral to the DOD's mission, not simply because their overall employment has a tangential connection. The district court's jury instruction on this issue was therefore erroneous and prejudicial, and the defendants' convictions should be reversed for a new trial on that basis. I concur that, under the majority's flawed broad reading of the statute, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant, albeit narrow, limitation on the application of mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), creating a potential as-applied Eighth Amendment defense for defendants required to carry specific weapons as part of their employment in a military context. The court's broad interpretation of MEJA's jurisdictional reach solidifies the government's ability to prosecute crimes committed abroad by contractors of any federal agency, so long as a nexus to the DOD's mission can be shown. Furthermore, the vacatur of Slatten's conviction underscores the importance of severance when a defendant's ability to present essential exculpatory evidence is compromised in a joint trial. The multiple fractured opinions highlight deep judicial divisions on applying domestic criminal statutes to the unique circumstances of overseas contractors, suggesting these issues are ripe for further review.
