United States v. Short
16 C.M.R. 11, 4 C.M.A. 437, 4 USCMA 437 (1954)
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Rule of Law:
An accused's genuine mistake of fact regarding a victim's consent can negate the specific intent element required for a conviction of assault with intent to commit rape, even if that mistake was objectively unreasonable.
Facts:
- On November 28, 1952, in Tokyo, Private Short and his companion, Private O’Rourke, who were intoxicated, approached two Japanese women, Yayoi Tomobe and Tokiko Okano.
- Frightened, Okano yelled for Tomobe to run and fled back to her nearby shop.
- Tomobe tripped on a stone, and as she regained her balance, Short caught her by the arm.
- Short pulled Tomobe into a public latrine, closed the door, and began to fondle her.
- Tomobe protested, repeatedly saying "No" in Japanese and trying to push Short away, but he was too strong.
- Short testified that he believed Tomobe was a prostitute with whom he had negotiated and agreed upon a price of 500 yen for sexual intercourse.
- Short claimed that he thought Tomobe was consenting to his actions inside the latrine.
Procedural Posture:
- The accused, Private Short, was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape by a general court-martial in Japan.
- The convening authority approved the findings but reduced the sentence of confinement from ten to five years.
- A board of review affirmed the conviction and the modified sentence.
- The United States Court of Military Appeals granted the accused's petition for review to consider the correctness of the jury instructions.
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Issue:
Does an accused's genuine, albeit potentially unreasonable, belief that the victim consented to sexual acts negate the specific intent required for a conviction of assault with intent to commit rape?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Quinn
Yes, a genuine mistake of fact can negate specific intent, but the conviction stands because the defense's requested jury instruction on this point was legally flawed. The offense of assault with intent to commit rape requires a specific intent to have carnal knowledge against the victim's will and to use whatever force is necessary for that purpose. The pivotal issue is the accused's state of mind at the time of the assault, not the extent of the woman's resistance. The defense's requested instruction on consent was properly rejected because it failed to qualify the accused’s belief by requiring that it be both honest and reasonable. Since the requested instruction was defective and the general instructions were sufficient, the law officer did not err in denying the specific requests.
Concurring - Judge Latimer
Yes, but the conviction should be affirmed because the general instructions given were adequate. While an inaccurate requested instruction can be sufficient to put a law officer on notice of an essential issue, there is no error if that issue is already adequately covered. In this case, the court was presented with two clear narratives: the prosecution's evidence of a forcible assault and the accused's defense of consensual arrangement for money. The general instructions given were sufficient for the court-martial to properly decide between these two versions of events, making the denied specific instruction unnecessary.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Judge Brosman
Yes, a genuine belief of consent, even if unreasonable, negates the required specific intent, and the failure to properly instruct the court-martial on this defense was a reversible error. Assault with intent to commit rape is a specific intent crime, unlike the general intent crime of rape. An unreasonable mistake of fact can negate the specific intent required for the former, even if it might not be a defense to the latter. If the accused genuinely believed the woman was consenting, he could not have formed the specific intent to overcome her resistance by force, because in his mind, there was no resistance to overcome. The defense's requested instruction put the law officer on notice of this crucial defense theory, and the failure to provide a correct instruction on it warrants a new trial.
Analysis:
This case is significant for its exploration of the mens rea (mental state) required for inchoate offenses versus completed offenses. The opinions, particularly the dissent, distinguish between the general intent required for rape and the specific intent for assault with intent to rape. The case establishes that for a specific intent crime, a defendant's subjective belief—even an unreasonable one—can serve as a defense if it negates that specific intent. This principle has become a cornerstone in the analysis of mistake-of-fact defenses in American criminal law, impacting how courts instruct juries on crimes requiring a specific purpose or goal.
